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A Moral/Contractual Approach to 
Labor Law Reform 
Zev J. Eigen* and David Sherwyn** 
When laws cease to operate as intended, legislators and scholars tend to propose new 
laws to replace or amend them. This Article posits an alternative: offering regulated 
parties the opportunity to contractually bind themselves to behave ethically. The perfect 
test case for this proposal is labor law, because (1) labor law has not been amended for 
decades, (2) proposals to amend it have failed for political reasons and are focused on 
union election win rates and less on the election process itself, (3) it is an area of law 
already statutorily regulating parties’ reciprocal contractual obligations, and (4) moral 
means of self-regulation derived from contract are more likely to be effective when 
parties have ongoing relationships like those between management and labor 
organizations. The Article explains how the current law and proposed amendments fail 
because they focus on fairness as a function of union win rates, and then outlines a plan 
to leverage strong moral contractual obligations and related norms of behavior to 
create as fair a process as possible for employees to vote unions up or down. 
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A formidable body of literature and a growing set of empirical 
research confirm that people obey the law for a host of reasons 
independent from a positivist rationale of obeying for the sake of 
obeying.1 Rationales offered include instrumental,2 social/relational,3 and 
 
 1. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (2006); Kent Greenawalt, The Natural 
Duty to Obey the Law, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1985); see also Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, The 
Common Place of Law (1998). 
 2. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1349, 
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moral.4 Recent research on contractual obedience suggests that morally 
framing an obligation to perform as contractually obligated yields greater 
likelihood and magnitude of performing an undesirable task as compared 
to framing the request to obey the same contract in terms of a legal 
threat.5 While extralegal effects like this are well recognized and, in some 
instances, may be more powerful than law by itself as a means of affecting 
behavior,6 to the Authors’ knowledge, they are not incorporated into plans 
for legal reform. That is, if tort law is broken, legislators and scholars 
most often suggest revising tort laws, not crafting nonlegal incentive 
structures like relational, social, or moral constraints that operate 
independently from the law or in conjunction therewith. We suggest 
doing just that as a means of reforming labor law. Specifically, we 
propose incorporating a set of moral7 principles embodied in a contract to 
which union and management would both be incentivized to agree, 
which would make the process of certifying unions as agents of collective 
bargaining significantly fair and would result in a less costly 
administrative system. 
Labor law is the perfect test case for such a proposal. Labor law 
involves state regulation of a tripartite relationship among labor 
 
1349–61 (2009) (presenting an instrumental view of contracts); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated 
Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 633, 635 (2010) 
(describing the economic prediction of human behavior as one in which an individual will breach a 
contract if breaching yields an extra dollar earned); see also Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J. 
Econ. 453, 454–57 (2003) (examining the cost of evicting tenants as a function of whether a judicial 
system is based on civil law or common law). 
 3. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1473–74 (1998) (using sociological and social-psychological 
literature to explain behavioral economics in law); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in 
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55, 61–62 (1963) (finding that parties in the automobile 
industry rely more heavily and often on relational grounds for enforcing contracts than on legal sanctions 
contained therein). See generally Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspective 
on Voluntary Deference to Authorities, 1 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 323 (1997). 
 4. See generally Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts: 
Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise and Performance, 41 J. Legal Stud. 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640245; Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, 
Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?, 100 Geo. L.J. 5 (2011); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & 
Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 405 (2009).  
 5. Eigen, supra note 4 (manuscript at 23). 
 6. Id.  
 7. We use the term “moral” throughout this Article loosely. As noted by others, there is lack of 
convergence among scholars on what is meant by “morals,” “ethics,” or “values” broadly. See, e.g., 
Steven Hitlin & Jane Allyn Piliavin, Values: Reviving a Dormant Concept, 30 Ann. Rev. Soc. 359, 360 
(2004). For the purposes of this Article, it is unnecessary to distinguish among the various 
conceptualizations and operationalizations of the term. We mean simply to refer to the set of 
constraints on behavior derivative from one’s sense of obligation based on communal norms of 
acceptable behavior; ideals about desirable characteristics, states, or actions; or evaluative beliefs on 
how to orient ourselves in contemporary life. Short of picking an unnecessary etymological fight for 
which the Authors are woefully unprepared, we use this term as a synthetic catch-all of definitions. 
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organizations, employers, and employees. The interrelationship among 
these actors may be legally constrained, but ultimately, most of the 
means of enforcement already lie in nonlegal, quasi-legal, and informal 
mechanisms, perhaps more so than in many other areas of law.8 By 
comparison, a dispute about how much federal income tax one owes will 
be resolved directly between the state and the individual, with the tax 
code as the legal standard indisputably relied upon by all. Unions and 
employers routinely rely heavily on their ongoing relationships to resolve 
legally valenced disputes (like employment discrimination) informally, 
leveraging the power of the parties’ ongoing relationship to fashion 
remedies all can accept.9 Labor law, therefore, has a built-in, preexisting 
basis for nonlegal compliance that heavily leverages the parties’ 
collective set of norms of behavior, reciprocity, morality, fairness, and 
justice. Additionally, labor law is ultimately a means of facilitating 
parties’ self-regulation via contract. Contract is deeply rooted in morality, 
social constraints, and norms of fairness and reciprocity, such that 
proposing extralegal ways of self-policing them may be more effective 
than purely legal means. These two factors make labor law an ideal space 
in which to test the Authors’ extralegal reform hypotheses. 
Before suggesting this reform, it is necessary to explain why such 
(perhaps) seemingly drastic reform is necessary. To do so, this Article 
asks two questions: Are the rights to be represented by a union and to 
collectively bargain with employers over wages, hours, and terms and 
conditions of employment worth saving, and, if they are, what is the best 
way to go about saving them? Considering the shocking lack of change to 
labor law since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”)10 in 1935 relative to the steadfast and voluminous changes to 
other laws regulating the workplace passed since that time,11 labor law 
reform is considered by many to be long overdue.12 However, labor law 
reform has been a failed promise under the previous two Democratic 
administrations, and likely will be under the current one as well. 
 
 8. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1527, 
1532 (2002); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions 
on Collective Action, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133, 181 (1996). 
 9. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 
418 (1990). 
 10. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2010)). 
 11. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between 
Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 575, 
584–93 (1992). 
 12. See, e.g., William B. Gould IV, Agenda for Reform: The Future of Employment 
Relationships and the Law 9 (1993); Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law 
Reform: Opening Up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 827, 828 (1996); 
Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality 
Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 369, 374 n.8 (2001); 
Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 97, 97 (1993). 
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President Carter proposed sweeping reform, including shortening the 
time for union elections, standardizing the rules for defining bargaining 
units, and increasing the penalties against employers who violate the 
law.13 Carter’s proposed reform lost on the Senate floor.14 President 
Clinton proposed prohibiting employers from permanently replacing 
striking employees.15 This proposed reform ended with the midterm 
elections of 1994.16 President Obama announced plans for the most 
aggressive labor law reform of the three presidents: the Employee Free 
Choice Act (“EFCA”).17 Under EFCA, an employer would have to 
recognize a union as the exclusive agent of the employees for collective 
bargaining over terms and conditions of employment if the union 
 
 13. Labor Reform Act of 1977, S. 1883, 95th Congress (1977). The following is an excerpt from a 
July 18, 1977, speech President Carter made to Congress: 
An election on union representation should be held within a fixed, brief period of time after 
a request for an election is filed with the Board. This period should be as short as is 
administratively feasible. The Board, however, should be allowed some additional time to 
deal with complex cases. 
The Board should be instructed to establish clear rules defining appropriate bargaining 
units. This change would not only help to streamline the time-consuming, case-by-case 
procedures now in effect, but would also allow labor and management to rely more fully on 
individual Board decisions. 
. . . . 
When employers are found to have refused to bargain for a first contract, the Board should 
be able to order them to compensate workers for the wages that were lost during the period 
of unfair delay. . . . 
The Board should be authorized to award double back-pay without mitigation to workers 
who were illegally discharged before the initial contract. This flat-rate formula would 
simplify the present time-consuming back-pay process and would more fully compensate 
employees for the real cost of a lost job. 
The Board should be authorized to prohibit a firm from obtaining Federal contracts for a 
period of three years, if the firm is found to have willfully and repeatedly violated NLRB 
orders. Such a debarment should be limited to cases of serious violations and should not 
affect existing contracts. . . . 
. . . . The Board should also be required to seek preliminary injunctions against certain 
unfair labor practices which interfere seriously with employee rights, such as unlawful 
discharges. 
James Earl Carter, President of the U.S., Labor Law Reform Message to the Congress Transmitting 
Proposed Legislation (July 18, 1977), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7821. 
 14. On June 22, 1978, Senate Bill 1883 (renumbered S. 2467), was recommitted to the Senate 
Human Resources Committee and did not reemerge. 124 Cong. Rec. 18,393–400 (1978). 
 15. Cesar Chavez Workplace Fairness Act, H.R. 5, 103d Cong. (1993). The bill was passed in the 
House of Representatives but died in the Senate.  
 16. In a last-ditch effort to effectuate some form of labor reform, President Clinton instituted an 
Executive Order prohibiting government contracts with employers who permanently replaced striking 
workers. Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (Mar. 8, 1995). The Executive Order was 
overturned by the D.C. Circuit on the grounds that it was preempted by the NLRA, which guarantees 
employers the right to replace striking workers. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 
1322, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 17. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. 
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presented the employer with “authorization cards” signed by employees 
stating that they want the union to represent them.18 Essentially, this 
authorization-card method for obtaining recognition would supplant the 
secret-ballot election whereby unions petition the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”)19 asking that the unit of employees they seek 
to represent vote for or against the union some thirty or more days 
following the petition, typically after both the employer and the union 
campaign for their votes.20 Under EFCA, the penalties for violations of 
the NLRA and related statutes would triple,21 and parties that did not 
reach a first contract within 120 days would be forced to submit their 
proposals to interest arbitration.22 Like with President Clinton, the 
midterm elections of President Obama’s first term have, for all intents 
and purposes, terminated the possibility of legislative labor law reform, 
especially as sweeping as EFCA promised to be.23 Labor law reform 
under President Obama, however, is not dead. Instead, the Obama 
administration’s NLRB24 has the power and, seemingly, the desire, to 
promulgate rules and hand down decisions that could satisfy organized 
labor’s most pressing goal: increasing union membership by making it 
easier to organize. 
It is understandable why labor seeks to increase union density in the 
U.S. At its height in the mid-1950s, organized labor represented about 
35% of the U.S. workforce.25 That percentage has declined steadily since 
that time, to 11.9%.26 In the private sector today, only 6.9% of the 
 
 18. Id. § 2. 
 19. The NLRB was established by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 153 
(2010). The NLRB is made up of five members appointed by the President for staggered five-year 
terms. Id. § 153(a). 
 20. S. 560 § 2(a). 
 21. Id. § 4(b)(1). 
 22. Id. § 3. Interest arbitration, traditionally used in the public sector, would result in an 
arbitrator deciding the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment for private-sector 
employees and employers. 
 23. The Democrats lost their majority in the House in 2010 and now are not close to the sixty 
votes needed in the Senate. 
 24. Traditionally, the NLRB consists of three members of the President’s party and two members 
of the party not in power. William B. Gould IV, Labored Relations: Law, Politics, and the 
NLRB—A Memoir 54 (2000). When President Bush left office, the NLRB had only two members. 
Currently, there are four members, three of whom are Democrats. See Board Members Since 1935, 
NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/board-members-1935 (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
 25. Paul Osterman et al., Working in America: A Blueprint for the New Labor Market 46 
(2001). 
 26. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and 
Employment Among All Wage and Salary Workers, 1973–2010, Unionstats.com, 
http://www.unionstats.com (follow “html” hyperlink located below “All Wage & Salary Workers”) 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2012); see also News Release, Union Members—2011, Bureau Lab. Stat. (Jan. 27, 
2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (reporting an 11.8% union membership rate in 
the U.S. in 2011). 
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workforce is unionized27—the approximate level just before the New 
Deal.28 What is unclear is whether labor law reform aimed at increasing 
union density is good for the U.S. economy, good for employees, good 
for employers and their customers, and whether employees ultimately 
want to unionize. Union leaders often answer these questions swiftly and 
definitively. According to organized labor, unionization benefits 
employees, customers, and the U.S. economy, and therefore should be 
encouraged whether employers like it or not.29 With regard to employee 
choice, organized labor contends that nearly all employees want to be 
unionized (or at least would want to be organized once the benefits of 
unionization are explained), and only reject unions in secret-ballot 
elections because the organizing system unfairly favors employers by 
allowing companies to get away with coercing and intimidating 
employees.30 Underlying these claims are some assumptions about the 
continued need for and utility of unionism in contemporary workplaces 
in the U.S. This Article evaluates these critical assumptions, addresses 
the most recent labor law reform attempt embodied in EFCA, and 
explains how an alternative reform approach endorsed by the Authors 
relies less on normative assumptions about whether unions should regain 
their dominance or should be allowed to continue to wither, and more on 
an essential underlying feature of modern liberal democratic theory: the 
right to freely elect one’s representatives or to remain free from 
representation. The proposed reform also departs from pure reliance on 
legal amendments, shifting to reliance on unions’ and employers’ joint 
and symbiotic reciprocity and collective moral obligation as a means of 
leveraging enforcement that theoretically could result in a greater 
likelihood of election results that closer accord the ultimate preferences 
of employees and in lower administrative costs of enforcement. 
 
 27. Hirsch & Macpherson, supra note 26 (follow “html” hyperlink located below “Private 
Sector”). 
 28. Osterman, supra note 25, at 46. 
 29. See, e.g., Unions Are Good for Business, Productivity and the Economy, AFL-CIO, 
http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/why/uniondifference/uniondiff8.cfm (last visited Feb. 14, 2012); see 
also Harley Shaiken, Ctr. for Am. Progress, The High Road to a Competitive Economy: A Labor 
Law Strategy (2004) (arguing that unionization benefits the economy and productivity, and 
advocating for card-check authorization against elections). 
 30. See, e.g., Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and 
Federal Labor Law, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 495, 546–600 (1993) (advocating against employer free speech in 
union elections and arguing that the existing process is wildly biased in favor of employers); Rafael 
Gomez & Morley Gunderson, The Experience Good Model of Trade Union Membership, in The 
Changing Role of Unions: New Forms of Representation 92, 108 (Phanindra V. Wunnava ed., 
2004) (concluding that the benefits of unions are opaque to nonunion members); Interactive Map: 
Unions Are Good for Workers and the Economy in Every State, Ctr. for Am. Progress Action Fund 
(Feb. 15, 2009), http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2009/02/unions_workers.html [hereinafter 
Union Map]. 
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Part I reviews research on the effects of unionization on employees 
and employers to address the question of whether a primary goal of 
national policy should be to abolish unions, champion their resurrection, 
or perpetuate the status quo. We conclude that existing scholarship does 
not support either abolishing or championing unionization, but that the 
status quo deserves to be revisited because the focus of advocates for 
reforming the current system is on win rates, and not sufficiently on 
employee choice. Part II then sets out a fair system maximizing employee 
free choice to unionize or not. Fairness ought not be defined exclusively 
by results, as in a distributive-justice-focused approach in which a high 
union win rate equals a fair system and a low union win rate equals an 
unfair system. Instead, we posit that a fair system is one that maximizes 
employees’ opportunities to make fully informed choices free of coercion 
or intimidation—embodying a procedural-justice focused approach. Part 
III analyzes the current systems in use and being proposed and finds that 
neither the status quo nor proposals by legislators or the NLRB satisfy 
our conceptualization of procedural-justice focused fairness. Part IV 
outlines a system that does satisfy our standard of fairness by capitalizing 
on extralegal behavioral norms derived in part from the long-standing 
moral principle of “living up to one’s word.” This would result in a 
system with greater self-regulation by the parties, lower administrative 
costs, and greater opportunity for employees to exercise their rights to 
vote for their representatives or to vote not to be represented in the 
workplace based on more complete information, free from coercion and 
intimidation. We conclude by discussing the implications of adopting the 
proposal advanced, and opportunities for extending it to other areas of 
law. 
I.  Are Employees and Employers Better or Worse Off 
When Organized? 
Unions may be assessed by how they impact the U.S. economy, 
employees, employers, and customers or recipients of the goods and 
services provided by organized workplaces. The ultimate question of 
whether the U.S. economy is better off with greater union density is 
complex and beyond the scope of this Article. Organized labor, 
industrial-relations theorists, and some academics, however, believe that 
unions are a net positive for the economy and that greater union density 
correlates linearly with improved economic prosperity.31 According to 
 
 31. See generally Bruce E. Kaufman, John R. Commons and the Wisconsin School on Industrial 
Relations Strategy and Policy, 57 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 3, 5–7 (2003) (discussing the early views of 
John R. Commons, a prominent institutionalist in the industrial-relations scholarship tradition, who 
came to believe that trade unions could improve the conditions of laboring people by using the “device 
of the common rule” and collective bargaining to “stabilize labor markets and equalize bargaining 
power, while also using methods of collective voice to replace industrial autocracy with industrial 
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organized labor, unions consistently provide higher wages and greater 
job security.32 This in turn “primes the consumption pump” and increases 
demand for goods and services.33 Increased demand requires employers 
to increase supplies of goods and services, which creates jobs (and 
therefore decreases unemployment) and increases GDP.34 To support 
this contention, labor points to the 1950s as a time of unprecedented and 
subsequently unmatched growth in unionization, union density, parity 
between rich and poor, and economic prosperity. This argument has 
appeal, but may be too simplistic. In the 1950s there was no real threat of 
foreign competition to U.S. employers, particularly those in heavily 
unionized workplaces.35 Europe and Japan were slowly recovering from 
the devastation of World War II, and the rest of today’s current and 
rising powers were still developing. Moreover, 1950s transportation and 
information systems obviously impeded foreign competition.36 Finally, 
the U.S. had seemingly unlimited natural resources. Thus, while it makes 
sense to credit unions with increasing wages, reducing the gap between 
rich and poor, and increasing consumers’ purchasing power, one could 
argue that high costs of unionization forced U.S. manufacturers to 
produce their goods outside of the U.S. and, thus, instead of being a 
solution to America’s economic woes, unionization was the cause. The 
positive union effect might have been short-term and conditional on 
historical context. Regardless of whether unionization is a reason for 
some of America’s trade and economic woes, it seems naïve to argue that 
the solution to America’s struggles in this global economy, where the 
U.S. has exported the vast majority of its manufacturing to reduce costs, 
is to increase wages through unionization. On the other hand, the 
argument that the gap between rich and poor depletes the middle class 
and reduces GDP because capital remains with the wealthy instead of 
being dispersed to those who will put the money back into the economy 
is very appealing. 
There is ample academic literature devoted to whether employees 
are better off when unionized. The general conclusion is that employees 
are better compensated but less satisfied.37 An early empirical 
examination of the impacts of unionization in the workplace begins with 
 
democracy”). 
 32. See David Madland & Karla Walter, Unions Are Good for the American Economy, Ctr. for 
Am. Progress Action Fund (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2009/02/ 
efca_factsheets.html; see also Union Map, supra note 30. 
 33. See Madland & Walter, supra note 32. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., William G. Shepherd, Causes of Increased Competition in the U.S. Economy, 1939–
1980, 64 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 613, 620–22 & tbl.4 (1982). 
 36. Michael E. Porter, Competition in Global Industries: A Conceptual Framework, in 
Competition in Global Industries 15, 42–45 (Michael E. Porter ed., 1986). 
 37. Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 20–21 (1984). 
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the observation that “unions alter nearly every . . . measurable aspect of 
the operation of workplaces.”38 This study has been credited as the first 
to stimulate scholarly interest in how unions affect factors beyond wages, 
including satisfaction, productivity, business profitability, investment, 
and the economy.39 Labor-relations scholars have since endeavored to 
uncover unionism’s effects on these various aspects. 
While unionization results in an increase in wages,40 it does not come 
with a concomitant increase in productivity, and therefore the increased 
salary expense reduces employer profit.41 For example, a 2004 study of 
thirteen years of operating, financial, and employment data for major 
airlines found union-imposed wage increases correlated with decreased 
employee productivity, decreased airplane productivity, and overall 
decreased operating margins.42 Interestingly, the study found that the 
“quality of labor relations” was a significant control variable.43 Sandra 
Black and Lisa Lynch confirm this dimension.44 In their analysis of a 
national survey of businesses, they found that firms with traditional 
labor-management relations had significantly lower productivity than did 
nonunion firms.45 However, when controlling for the presence of certain 
employee-empowering practices (for example, total quality management 
and profit sharing), the impact of unionization on productivity dwindled 
to statistical insignificance.46 Similarly, Harry Holzer analyzed a 1982 
 
 38. Id. at 19. 
 39. See James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman, What Do Unions Do?: A Twenty-Year 
Perspective, 25 J. Lab. Res. 339, 339 (2004); Barry T. Hirsch, What Do Unions Do for Economic 
Performance?, 25 J. Lab. Res. 415, 415 (2004). 
 40. That unionization increases wages is generally accepted among scholars. See Freeman & 
Medoff, supra note 37, at 20 (finding that unionization results in increased wages and fringe benefits); 
David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect Do Unions Have on Wages Now and Would 
Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, 25 J. Lab. Res. 383, 406–07 (2004) (finding that unionization does 
not increase wages as much as it did in the 1970s but that the wage premium is substantial). 
 41. See John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and Growth: 
Has the Long Run Arrived?, 7 J. Lab. Econ. 72, 92 (1989) (reviewing several studies and concluding 
that, on average, unionization is associated with decreased productivity); Hirsch, supra note 39, at 430–
31 (reconciling a number of studies and concluding that unionization does not increase productivity, 
and thus that the increased wages may result in decreased profitability); cf. John T. Addison, The 
Determinants of Firm Performance: Unions, Works Councils, and Employee Involvement/High-
Performance Work Practices, 52 Scot. J. Pol. Econ. 406, 416 (2005) (finding the small positive effect of 
unionization on productivity unable to compensate for the increased wage expense). But see Christos 
Doucouliagos & Patrice Laroche, What Do Unions Do to Productivity? A Meta-Analysis, 42 Indus. 
Rel. 650, 682 (2003) (reporting results of a meta-regression analysis that found a neutral or positive 
effect of unionization on productivity, especially in manufacturing). 
 42. Jody Hoffer Gittell et al., Mutual Gains or Zero-Sum? Labor Relations and Firm Performance 
in the Airline Industry, 57 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 163, 174–77 & tbl.3 (2004). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and 
Information Technology on Productivity, 83 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 434, 444 (2001). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 440–41. 
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survey of firms, finding the negative effect of wage increases on profit 
was greater if a union imposed the wage increase than if the firm itself 
imposed the increase.47 
Despite higher wages, union workers tend to report lower job 
satisfaction than nonunion workers. Richard Freeman and James Medoff 
synthesized a broad range of research and concluded that, while 
unionization results in higher wages and fringe benefits, it also correlates 
with decreased employee satisfaction, especially with respect to working 
conditions and relationships with management.48 Similarly, a 1983 
national survey found that unionized workers reported higher 
satisfaction with pay than did nonunion workers, but lower satisfaction 
with respect to work duties, coworkers, supervisors, and promotions, 
leading to lower global satisfaction ratings.49 
Scholars have posed a number of theories to explain this apparent 
paradox, including that: (1) “unions galvanize worker discontent in order 
to make a strong case in negotiations with management”;50 (2) the 
grievance and negotiation experience primes employees to perceive 
negative conditions more saliently;51 (3) dissatisfied union workers 
continue working under conditions where their nonunion counterparts 
would quit, thereby self-selecting out of the dataset52 (the “exit-voice” 
 
 47. Harry J. Holzer, Wages, Employer Costs, and Employee Performance in the Firm, 43 Indus. & 
Lab. Rel. Rev. (Special Issue) 147, 161–163 (1990). Empirical studies have uncovered manifold other 
disadvantages that employers suffer as a result of unionization. See, e.g., Freeman & Medoff, supra 
note 37, at 21 (less overall flexibility in business operations); Addison & Hirsch, supra note 41, at 99 
(reduced investment in physical capital and research and development); David J. Flanagan & Satish P. 
Deshpande, Top Management’s Perceptions of Changes in HRM Practices After Union Elections in 
Small Firms: Implications for Building Competitive Advantage, 34 J. Small Bus. Mgmt. 23, 29–33 & 
tbl.4 (1996) (reduced ability to implement “innovative” human-resource policies, such as merit-based 
promotion and compensation and internal recruiting); Hirsch, supra note 39, at 436 (reduced 
investment in physical capital and research and development). 
 48. Freeman & Medoff, supra note 37, at 21. 
 49. Chris J. Berger et al., Effects of Unions on Job Satisfaction: The Role of Work-Related Values 
and Perceived Rewards, 32 Org. Behav. & Hum. Performance 289, 304, 308, 310, 314 (1983); see also 
Tove Helland Hammer & Ariel Avgar, The Impact of Unions on Job Satisfaction, Organizational 
Commitment, and Turnover, 26 J. Lab. Res. 241, 257 (2005) (synthesizing job-satisfaction research and 
concluding that the negative impact on satisfaction is explained by dissatisfaction with job quality, 
supervision, and the labor-management relations climate); Charles A. Odewahn & M.M. Petty, A 
Comparison of Levels of Job Satisfaction, Role Stress, and Personal Competence Between Union 
Members and Nonmembers, 23 Acad. Mgmt. J. 150, 153 (1980) (finding that union workers report 
significantly lower satisfaction with work and pay than do nonmembers). But see Luis R. Gomez-Mejia 
& David B. Balkan, Faculty Satisfaction with Pay and Other Job Dimensions Under Union and 
Nonunion Conditions, 27 Acad. Mgmt. J. 591, 600 (1984) (finding that union faculty had higher pay 
satisfaction, and finding no relationship between unionism and other aspects of satisfaction). 
 50. Freeman & Medoff, supra note 37, at 21. 
 51. George J. Borjas, Job Satisfaction, Wages, and Unions, 14 J. Hum. Resources 21, 38 (1979); 
Hammer & Avgar, supra note 49, at 242–43. 
 52. Borjas, supra note 51; see also Joni Hersch & Joe A. Stone, Is Union Job Dissatisfaction 
Real?, 25 J. Hum. Resources 736, 750 (1990) (reporting empirical results consistent with the exit-voice 
hypothesis). 
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hypothesis53); (4) poor labor-management relations drive dissatisfaction;54 
(5) union members seek out union jobs because these employees have 
higher aspirations and expectations;55 and (6) unions organize where 
working conditions are worse to begin with.56 Nonetheless, no single 
theory has garnered a consensus. 
In addition to the firm-based research cited above, anecdotal 
evidence supports the argument that unionized businesses are less 
profitable than are nonunion firms in the same sector. An example of 
such anecdotal evidence is found in the hotel industry. Hotel owners and 
operators believe that their union properties are less profitable than their 
nonunion properties.57 Industry experts claim that union work rules 
(regarding job duties and working hours) and health and welfare 
obligations will make an organized hotel less profitable than a nonunion 
hotel even if the latter has higher wages.58 Indeed, one hotel evaluator 
stated that in evaluating a property for sale, unionization will, depending 
on the contract and the union, result in a 10% to 20% decrease in value.59 
Another real estate investor stated that because of increased costs, the 
 
 53. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States (1970). Hirschman defined voice as the decision to complain about a 
perceived deterioration of a condition or set of conditions experienced at an organization. Id. at 4. He 
regarded voice as somewhat mutually exclusive to “exit” (the decision to remove oneself from the 
offending condition). Id. He theorized, somewhat tautologically perhaps, that the likelihood of voice 
increases with the degree of “loyalty” to the organization. Id. at 78. It should be noted that voice can 
be conceptualized as a form of complaining about work conditions, or it can be characterized by 
participation in a pluralist, democratic process. The latter is the view taken by institutionalists, see 
John R. Commons, American Shoemakers, 1648–1895: A Sketch of Industrial Evolution, 24 Q.J. Econ. 
39 (1909), and industrial relations scholars, see John W. Budd, Employment with a Human Face: 
Balancing Efficiency, Equity, and Voice (2004); H.A. Clegg, Pluralism in Industrial Relations, 13 
Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 309 (1975). 
 54. Keith A. Bender & Peter J. Sloane, Job Satisfaction, Trade Unions, and Exit-Voice Revisited, 
51 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 222, 231–32 & tbls.3 & 4, 235 (1998); cf. James W. Carillon & Robert I. 
Sutton, The Relationship Between Union Effectiveness and the Quality of Members’ Worklife, 
3 J. Occupational Behav. 171, 178 (1982) (studying public schoolteachers and finding a positive effect 
on job satisfaction when the union excelled in five areas: economic bargaining, member protection, 
working-conditions bargaining, involving members in decisions, and improving relations with 
coworkers). 
 55. See Alex Bryson et al., Does Union Membership Really Reduce Job Satisfaction?, 42 Brit. J. 
Indus. Rel. 439, 452 (2004) (studying unionized employees in the U.K.); Hammer & Avgar, supra 
note 49, at 258–59.  
 56. Borjas, supra note 51, at 28. 
 57. In November of 2008 Professor Sherwyn, who was serving as the academic director of the 
Center for Hospitality Research, hosted a real estate finance roundtable at the law offices of 
Proskauer Rose in New York City. The Roundtable featured hotel owners, operators, bankers, 
consultants, deal makers, and professors. The consensus of the group was that unionized hotels would 
provide lower returns than would nonunion hotels and that unionization could be a deal breaker in 
many situations. See Ctr. for Hosp. Res., Cornell Univ. Sch. of Hotel Admin., Real Estate Finance 
Roundtable (Nov. 10, 2008).  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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unionization status of a hotel will determine whether or not a company 
will purchase a property.60 Hotel operators contend that the inefficiencies 
caused by union work rules discourage investors from investing in 
properties because they will not provide an adequate return, causing a 
reduction in those willing to build, own, or operate hotels.61 The logical 
extension of this argument is that such investor decisions will not only 
reduce jobs in the hotel industry, but that related industries such as 
construction, food service, airlines, recreation, and retail will all suffer as 
well. 
While unions contest the argument that union hotels are less 
profitable than nonunion properties,62 they also ask, “so what?” Union 
advocates argue that exchanging profits for higher wages, increased job 
security, employee voice, and all other union benefits is a positive trade.63 
Indeed, union advocates can compare the wages and benefits in 
unionized cities like New York and Las Vegas to, for example, Dallas 
and Atlanta and show that in unionized hotels, housekeepers and 
banquet waiters lead middle-class and, sometimes, upper-middle-class 
lives.64 Alternatively, employer advocates may point to the fact that 
nonunion hotels in Chicago and San Francisco pay higher wages than 
their unionized counterparts.65 Unionists argue that it is the threat of 
unionization that causes the high wages and that the free-rider problem 
should be eliminated, not perpetuated.66 
Despite the assertions from those on both sides of the debate that 
the U.S. would be better off were it to favor either labor or capital, there 
is no clear answer to this question and, thus, neither the parties’ opinions 
nor their lobbying dollars should define national policy on this matter. 
Instead, we argue that the focus should be on the microdata. The 
evidence, however, is mixed. Employees are better off, but less satisfied, 
 
 60. Paul Wagner, an attorney with Stokes, Roberts, & Wagner, was hired by a major real estate 
developer to examine whether the developer could open a nonunion hotel in a city with a neutrality 
agreement. Wagner reports that the developer stated that he could not afford to open the hotel if it 
were unionized. Interview with Paul Wagner, Attorney, Stokes, Roberts & Wagner, in Ithaca, N.Y. 
(Aug. 21, 2010). 
 61. See Real Estate Finance Roundtable, supra note 57. 
 62. In a 2006 speech at Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Workers 
United president Bruce Raynor stated that union hotels are more profitable and provide better service 
than nonunion properties. Raynor admitted he had no data to support this statement. Bruce Raynor, 
President, Workers United, Address at Cornell Univ. Sch. of Indus. & Labor Rel. (Oct. 26, 2006).  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. At the Tenth Annual Labor and Employment Roundtable sponsored by Cornell’s Schools of 
Hotel Administration, Industrial & Labor Relations, and Law, hotel negotiators stated that many 
nonunion hotels in Chicago and San Francisco pay higher wages than do union properties. See Cornell 
Univ. Sch. of Hotel Admin., Labor & Employment Roundtable (May 15, 2011).  
 66. See Raynor, supra note 62; see also Ozkan Eren, Does Membership Pay Off for Covered 
Workers? A Distributional Analysis of the Free Rider Problem, 62 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 367, 367–68 
(2009). 
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when unionized. Unionized employers enjoy lower profits than nonunion 
firms. Without evidence to support either side’s macro position, we 
should not enact labor law reform whose sole purpose is to either 
enhance or reduce union influence. Instead, we contend that national 
policy regarding union organizing should be to ensure that the system is 
fair. Below, we define what we believe to be fair and then analyze (1) the 
current system, (2) labor’s preferred system (neutrality agreements with 
card check or EFCA), and (3) the latest proposed fix to the problem—
short elections. After explaining why these systems fail to meet our 
definition of fairness, we introduce the moral principles of union 
organizing embodied in a contractual arrangement between management 
and labor and explain why this system should be enacted. 
II.  What Is Fair? 
Commentators, scholars, legislators, and advocates seem to 
habitually overweigh the results of systems (such as adjudication 
outcomes or election results) to determine the fairness of systems being 
evaluated. For example, there is substantial literature comparing the 
results of discrimination cases resolved in litigation with those resolved in 
arbitration.67 One underlying theme of this work is that systems are fair if 
they have comparable results.68 Alternatively, according to some, there is 
a positive relationship between plaintiff victories and fairness.69 Similarly, 
there are those who point to the results of union-organizing drives and 
elections and make conclusions about the fairness of the process by 
looking at the results.70 The system is fair, according to some, if the union 
wins the majority of elections and is unfair when the union win rate 
drops. In fact, we contend that, standing alone, the results of an 
 
 67. See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path 
for Empirical Research, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1567–78, 1586–91 (2005) (reviewing prior empirical 
research and presenting the results of a case study finding arbitration faster and more efficient than 
litigation); Frederick L. Sullivan, Accepting Evolution in Workplace Justice: The Need for Congress to 
Mandate Arbitration, 26 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 281, 308–12 (2004); see also Curtis Brown, Cost-
Effective, Fast and Fair: What the Empirical Data Indicate About ADR, Metro. Corp. Counsel, Nov. 
2004, at 56, 70 (summarizing several empirical studies comparing litigation with arbitration); Theodore 
Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical 
Comparison, Disp. Resol. J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 44, 48 & tbl.1; Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at 
Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American 
Arbitration Association, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 777, 824 (2003); Lewis L. Maltby, Private 
Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 29, 46 (1998).  
 68. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 67, at 309 (asserting that arbitration is fair to plaintiffs because 
they are more successful in arbitration than in litigation).  
 69. David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1247, 1262–
63 (2009) (arguing that the empirical evidence tends to suggest that mandatory arbitration is unfair, as 
measured by aggregate pro-plaintiff dispositions). 
 70. Kate Bronfenbrenner & Tom Juravich, The Impact of Employer Opposition on Union 
Certification Win Rates: A Private/Public Sector Comparison (Econ. Policy Inst., Working Paper No. 113, 
1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/19/. 
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adjudication system or a union-representation election do not reveal 
anything about fairness, regardless of how many cases are analyzed. 
An analogy illustrates our point. Assume one of the Authors of this 
Article, a middle-aged professor who was once an average high school 
basketball player on a bad high school team, is set to play ten games of 
one-on-one basketball. The rules are as follows: games to eleven, one 
point for each basket, the scorer keeps possession of the ball, and players 
call their own fouls. The professor loses all ten games 11–0. An argument 
that the rules of the games played were unfair based solely on the 
observed outcomes is flawed because it does not account for the identity 
of the professor’s opponent. If it turns out that the opponent is Michael 
Jordan (regarded as one of the greatest players ever to play the game 
professionally), claims that the games were “unfair” are undoubtedly 
spurious at worst and grossly incomplete at best. Conversely, if 
Professors Sherwyn and Eigen were to play ten games and the rules were 
such that Eigen had to adhere to the regular rules of basketball, but 
Sherwyn got to shoot on a basket that was eight feet off the ground (two 
feet closer to the ground than a regulation basketball rim), did not have 
to dribble the ball, and was allowed to foul Eigen, we would hopefully 
agree that the rules were unfair, regardless of the results. Outcomes 
alone do not define fairness, nor should they automatically lead one to 
assume unfair rules or cheating.71 
The fairness correlation between rules and outcomes can be 
assessed only if we have determinative information prior to the time that 
we invoke the system. In sports, we would need to know the abilities of 
the teams. If the teams are equal, then a fair system would result in each 
team winning about half the games. In discrimination claims, we would 
need to know if the employer violated the law. Thus, if plaintiffs who go 
to trial in discrimination cases were in fact discriminated against 90% of 
the time, a fair system should generate approximately a 90% employee 
win rate. If plaintiffs were discriminated against only 10% of the time, we 
should expect to see a 10% win rate. With respect to discrimination, 
because the trial determines liability, we cannot judge the fairness of the 
system merely by analyzing results. Put another way, the so-called “base 
 
 71. Interestingly, if instead of Sherwyn versus Eigen in the second hypothetical set of games, it 
were again Sherwyn versus Michael Jordan, and Sherwyn received the benefit not being bound by the 
standard rules, one might argue for a different view of the fairness of the system. If one expects the 
players to be unequal in terms of resources available, one would be more likely to perceive 
unbalanced rules as leveling a playing field and, hence, as more fair. In the employment setting, one 
might perceive employers as possessing more resources and information and, hence, if the rules of 
litigation applied to employers the same way as employees, one would expect outcomes to 
disproportionately favor employers. Ironically, attempts made to level the litigation playing field by 
giving employees greater access to adjudication on the merits via arbitration are sometimes perceived 
as a creating a less fair system than litigation. 
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rate fallacy”72 underlies our complaint about fairness here. Without 
information on the reference category’s base rate (how much employers 
discriminate in our example above), there is insufficient information on 
which to base a decision on fairness. This often does not stop people 
from making incorrect assumptions or backing into assumptions, as 
described above.73 
Union advocates often argue that in union elections we do in fact 
know employees’ desires prior to the election system. As explained 
below, to petition for an election, unions need 30%,74 but often get over 
60%, of employees to sign cards saying they wish to be represented by 
the union.75 Because unions almost always have enough support to win 
an election before the campaign begins, they contend that the system is 
unfair because despite such support, unions lose anywhere from 28% to 
69% of elections each year.76 In fact, according to a recent study of 22,382 
organizing drives occurring between 1994 and 2004 that filed an election 
petition, secret-ballot elections were held in only 14,615 (65%).77 Of 
those 14,615 elections, unions won 8155, or 56%.78 
However, many employees sign authorization cards not because 
they want a union, but because they are willing to vote for or against a 
union in a secret-ballot election.79 This might be due to the low perceived 
cost of saying yes to such a process, or it might be due to employees not 
wanting to be a hold out if other employees want to vote. It might reflect 
employees’ respect for the American ideal of the democratic process of 
voting for one’s representative, even if employees sign cards planning to 
vote against the union. It might be due to lawful (or unlawful) pressure 
exerted by union organizers on employees. Moreover, the signing of 
cards represents the culmination of the union’s unilateral attempt to 
organize the employees. During the card-signing time the employees 
hear only one side of the story. By the time of the election, employees 
have heard both sides and may make a more informed decision. Is it 
possible that employers intimidate and otherwise unfairly influence 
 
 72. Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive, Normative, and 
Methodological Challenges, 19 Behav. & Brain Sci. 1, 1 (1996) (using an example of a coach on an 
Olympic basketball team trying to decide between two players to make a final attempt at shooting the 
game-winning basket, to illustrate the author’s point on base-rate fallacy). 
 73. Id. 
 74. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (2010). 
 75. See Andrew W. Martin, The Institutional Logic of Union Organizing and the Effectiveness of 
Social Movement Repertoires, 113 Am. J. Soc. 1067, 1072 (2008) (contending that many unions will not 
file for a certification election until a majority of workers sign authorization cards). 
 76. See id. at 1089 tbl.7, 1096 fig.A-2. 
 77. John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of Union Organizing 
Drives, 1999–2004, 62 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 3, 6 tbl.1 (2009). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Terrible Tactics, SEIU Exposed, http://www.seiuexposed.com/tactics.cfm (last visited Feb. 
14, 2012). 
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employees? Of course. On the other hand, the drop in union support 
could be the result of more complete information. For example, few 
would argue that an election for political office was unfair if the following 
occurred: the voters were introduced to one candidate, were inundated 
with positive information about the candidate, overwhelmingly signed a 
petition approving the candidate’s ability to run for office, and then 
voted for a second candidate who came onto the scene four weeks before 
the election and told a better story than the first candidate. 
Union losses could also reflect significant change in American taste 
for organized labor and collective rights and voice in the workplace. For 
example, from the 1940s through the 1970s, the height of the private-
sector union movement, pro-union messages abounded in popular 
culture. Anecdotally, but for purposes of illustration and comparison, 
Woody Guthrie sang about joining unions,80 textile workers had little 
kids singing “look for the union label,”81 and Sally Field won the 
Academy Award in 1979 for her role as employee and union organizer 
Norma Rae.82 Even On the Waterfront, a 1954 Academy Award-winning 
film83 that portrayed unions in less than positive terms, concluded with 
employees getting their union back and running it on the “up and up.”84 
Today, in contrast, unions are the entities that cost us the World Series in 
1994,85 have parents and education advocates Waiting for “Superman” to 
break union power,86 and are being blamed for driving states into near 
bankruptcy.87 Accordingly, a 2009 Gallup poll indicated a sharp decline 
in Americans’ approval of labor unions—48% approve, down from 59% 
the year before.88 A corresponding poll in 2010 reported a 52% approval 
rating.89 For comparison, in 1936 and 1957, the approval ratings were 
72% and 75%, respectively.90  
 
 80. Woody Guthrie, Union Maid, on Hard Travelin’: The Asch Recordings, Vol. 3 
(Smithsonian Folkways Recordings 1999); Woody Guthrie, Union Burying Ground, on Struggle 
(Smithsonian Folkways Recordings 1990). 
 81. See Look for the Union Label Commercial (1981). 
 82. See Oscar Legacy: The 52nd Academy Awards, Acad. Motion Picture Arts & Sci., 
http://www.oscars.org/awards/academyawards/legacy/ceremony/52nd.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
 83. See Oscar Legacy: The 27th Academy Awards, Acad. Motion Picture Arts & Sci., 
http://www.oscars.org/awards/academyawards/legacy/ceremony/27th.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
 84. On the Waterfront (Columbia Pictures 1954). 
 85. See Year in Review: 1994 National League, Baseball Almanac, http://www.baseball-
almanac.com/yearly/yr1994n.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2012); 
 86. Waiting for “Superman” (Electric Kinney Films 2010). 
 87. See, e.g., Can You Blame Unions for Golden State’s Fiscal Problems?, Fox Bus. (Oct. 27, 2011), 
http://video.foxbusiness.com/v/1243118545001/can-you-blame-unions-for-golden-states-fiscal-problems/. 
 88. Lydia Saad, Labor Unions See Sharp Slide in U.S. Public Support, Gallup (Sept. 3, 2009) 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122744/Labor-Unions-Sharp-Slide-Public-Support.aspx. 
 89. Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Approval of Labor Unions Remains near Record Low, Gallup (Aug. 
12, 2010) http://www.gallup.com/poll/142007/Americans-Approval-Labor-Unions-Remains-Near-Record- 
Low.aspx. 
 90. Id. 
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In Wisconsin, Governor Scott Walker introduced a “Budget 
Repair” bill on February 11, 2011, that directly targets unions.91 As of the 
writing of this Article, several other states, including Tennessee, Ohio, 
and Nevada, are expected to follow suit.92 Four states’ attorneys general 
have announced their intention to “vigorously defend” state 
constitutional provisions mandating secret-ballot elections.93 On 
February 1, 2012, the Indiana Senate voted 28–22 to pass a right-to-work 
bill, making Indiana the twenty-third state in the nation with such a law,94 
and legislators in Michigan (long known as the strongest of union states) 
are contemplating a proposal that would make that state the nation’s 
twenty-fourth right-to-work state.95  
Do employees want to be represented by unions? Are Americans 
now more anti-union than we were in the Fifties? Does full information 
lead to greater unionization or to union losses? Do unions fail to 
organize because employers intimidate employees? Because there are 
simply too many uncontrollable factors to judge, we contend that 
election results simply do not provide evidence of whether or not the 
system itself is fair. Accordingly, it is time to change the paradigm on 
how we judge fairness. 
We contend that a fair system will result in employees believing that 
they had enough information to make an informed decision, that they 
were respected, and that they were not intimidated, threatened or 
coerced. Such a system would be fair regardless of whether unions win or 
lose the majority of elections held. Below, we examine the current and 
proposed systems to see if they are fair under our new standard. We also 
 
 91. See Governor Walker Introduces Budget Repair, ScottWalker.org (Feb. 1i, 2011), 
http://www.scottwalker.org/news/2011/02/governor-walker-introduces-budget-repair. 
 92. Republicans Challenging Unions in State Capitols, ABCNews.com (Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=12946800. 
 93. Letter from Alan Wilson, S.C. Att’y Gen., et al., to Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, 
NLRB (Jan. 27, 2011), available at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/ag4_letter_to_nlrb_ 
gc_1-27-2011.pdf; see also Lawrence E. Dube, Four States Defend Secret Ballot Laws, as GOP Senators 
Back Them with New Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at AA-1 (Jan. 27, 2011). 
 94. Susan Guyett, Indiana Becomes 23rd “Right-to-Work” State, Reuters, Feb. 1, 2012, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-unions-indiana-righttowork-idUSTRE81018920120201. 
 95. See H.R. 6348, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2010). For the twenty-two other right-to-work 
states’ laws, see Ariz. Const. art XXV; Ark. Const. amend. XXXIV; Fla. Const. art. I, § 6; Kan. 
Const. art. XV, § 12; Miss. Const. art. VII, § 198-A; Neb. Const. art. XV, § 13; Okla. Const. art. 
XXIII, § 1A; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 2; Ala. Code § 25-7-30 (2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 34-6-21 (2010); 
Idaho Code Ann. § 44-2003 (2011); Iowa Code §§ 731.1–.8 (2011); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:981 
(2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 613.130, 613.230, 613.250 (2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-80 (2011); N.D. 
Cent. Code § 34-01-14 (2011); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-7-10 (2011); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-201 (2011); 
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 101.301 (2011); Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-34-1 to -17 (2011); Va. Code Ann. 
§§ 40.1-58 to -69 (2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-7-108 to -115 (2011). New Hampshire’s recent right-to-
work proposal, H.R. 474-FN, 2011 Leg. (N.H. 2011), was vetoed by the governor. See Governor 
Lynch’s Veto Message Regarding HB 474, N.H. Off. Governor (May 11, 2011), 
http://www.governor.nh.gov/media/news/2011/051111-veto-hb474.htm. 
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analyze the current and proposed systems to see if they would solve the 
problems they wish to resolve and would produce desired results. 
III.  The Traditional System for Union Organizing and 
Attempts to Reform It 
The union-organizing process begins in one of several ways. 
Sometimes, dissatisfied employees seek out a union.96 Other times, 
unions initiate discussions with employees.97 In fact, organizers may enter 
an employer’s property and hand out authorization cards or set up picket 
lines at the entrances and exits to the property.98 Unions may use current 
employees to “sell” the union to coworkers.99 Finally, unions sometimes 
send their members to apply for jobs with nonunion employers the 
unions wish to organize.100 Regardless of how the organizing begins, the 
union must soon meet with a number of employees to see if there is 
interest in organizing. 
A. NLRB Rules for Organizing and Secret-Ballot Elections 
The NLRA sets forth the laws regulating this form of employee 
organization.101 Under those rules, before any labor organization can be 
certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for any group of 
employees, the employees in that group, called a bargaining unit, vote for 
or against union representation in a secret-ballot election monitored by 
the NLRB.102 In most cases, the NLRB seeks to schedule such an election 
approximately six to eight weeks after the union initiates the process by 
filing a representation petition.103 This time period may be extended if the 
 
 96. Employees often seek out unions because of perceived failures in one or more of five key 
areas: lack of recognition, weak management, poor communication, substandard working conditions, 
and noncompetitive wages and benefits. See Martin Jay Levitt, Confessions of a Union Buster 49 
(1993). 
 97. Labor Union Organizing in the United States Workplace, HRHero.com, http://www.hrhero.com/ 
topics/union.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
 98. See, e.g., Johnson & Hardin Co. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 237, 240–42 (6th Cir. 1995) (enforcing a 
NLRB order finding that an employer unlawfully interfered with its employees’ section 7 rights where 
the employer excluded union representatives from distributing union literature on state-owned 
property outside the employer’s place of business). 
 99. See Labor Union Organizing, supra note 97. 
 100. The applicants’ reason for seeking employment is to organize the real employees. This 
method, referred to as “salting,” was the subject of a Supreme Court case in which the Court held that 
an employer cannot refuse to hire a “salt” simply because the real reason the employee seeks 
employment with the company is to organize it. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 
96–98 (1995). 
 101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2010). 
 102. Id. § 159(e)(1). 
 103. See Customer Service Standards: Representation Cases, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/ 
customer-service-standards#representation (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). In 2010, the median time period 
between filing the petition and the initial election was thirty-eight days, and 95.1% of all initial 
elections occurred within fifty-six days of the filing. Memorandum GC 11-03 from Lafe E. Solomon, 
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employer contests the bargaining unit or if other issues arise.104 In a 
recent study of 22,382 organizing drives from 1999–2004, the average 
case that went to election did so in forty-one days, and 95% of elections 
were held within seventy-five days of filing.105 It is during this time 
period, often referred to quite appropriately as the “campaign period,” 
that employers and unions try to persuade the voting employees. 
Unionists argue that more time translates into more opportunities for 
management to threaten, intimidate, and coerce employees into voting 
against the union.106 Others posit that more time in the campaign period 
translates into a greater likelihood that employees will render informed 
decisions on voting day.107 Regardless of which is correct, it is clear that 
delay helps management.108 In fact, there is evidence to suggest that even 
a one-day delay can affect the election in the employer’s favor.109 
Under the NLRB’s rules, a union may request the secret-ballot 
election only if a minimum of 30% of the employees in an appropriate 
bargaining unit have signed authorization cards.110 As a practical matter, 
however, most national unions will not file a petition unless at least 60% 
of the employees have signed cards.111 To prevail in the election, the 
union needs a simple majority of those who actually vote, not a majority 
of those who would be represented in the bargaining unit.112 Thus, if fifty 
 
Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Employees of the Office of the Gen. Counsel 5 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580434379. 
 104. Gordon Lafer, Am. Rights at Work, Free and Fair? How Labor Law Fails U.S. 
Democratic Election Standards 22 (2005). 
 105. Ferguson, supra note 77, at 10 n.9. 
 106. John Logan et al., U.C. Berkeley Ctr. for Labor Research. & Educ., New Data: NLRB 
Process Fails to Ensure a Fair Vote 2–4 (2011). 
 107. See Richard Epstein, The Case Against the Employee Free Choice Act 25–26 (Univ. of Chi. 
Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 452, 2009). 
 108. See Ferguson, supra note 77, at 14 (noting the negative impact of delay on union election win 
rates). See generally Myron Roomkin & Richard N. Block, Case Processing Time and the Outcome of 
Representation Elections: Some Empirical Evidence, 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 75 (presenting a model of 
election outcomes that includes delay as a significant predictor).  
 109. See Ferguson, supra note 77, at 14. 
 110. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (2010). 
 111. Telephone Interview with Richard W. Hurd, Professor of Indus. & Lab. Rel., Cornell Univ. 
(June 28, 2001); accord Jack Fiorito, Union Organizing in the United States, in Union Organizing: 
Campaigning for Trade Union Recognition 191, 200 (Gregor Gall ed., 2003); Martin, supra note 75, 
at 1072 (contending that many unions will not file for a certification election until a majority of 
workers sign authorization cards). Frankly, this is a conservative estimate based on conversations the 
Authors have had with union officials over the past seven years. Some assert that the percentage of 
employees the union considers supporters (based on authorization card signatures) is between 75% 
and 90%. 
 112. The relevant provision reads: “Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of 
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be 
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Although this 
language seems to require a majority of all employees in a bargaining unit, it has been interpreted to 
require only a majority of those employees who vote. Marlin-Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 586, 
588 (2d Cir. 1941). 
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employees are in the proposed bargaining unit but only twenty-one vote, 
the union needs only eleven votes to win. Employers win in the event of 
a tie.113 
B. NLRB Rules Regarding Campaigning Before Elections and 
Arguments About the Effects of the Rules on the Process 
The current rules state that during the campaign period, employers 
may not threaten,114 interrogate,115 make promises to,116 or engage in 
surveillance of employees.117 In addition, employers may not solicit 
grievances118 or confer benefits.119 If the employer violates these rules, the 
NLRB may either order the election to be rerun or issue a bargaining 
order.120 
Under the law, employers may, however, engage in numerous 
campaign activities to convince employees to vote against the union. 
During the campaign period, employers provide employees with the 
management perspective of employees’ rights and the consequences of 
voting in favor of the union.121 To get their message across, employers can 
 
 113. C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 114. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2010); NLRB v. St. Francis Healthcare Ctr., 212 F.3d 945, 962 (6th Cir. 
2000) (finding that the employer unlawfully interfered with a representation election by threatening to 
close the facility if the union were elected). 
 115. See Tamper, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 907, 938 (1973) (finding an unfair labor practice where the 
employer coercively interrogated its employees about their union sympathies). 
 116. See NLRB v. Wis-Pak Foods, Inc., 125 F.3d 518, 522–23 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that a promise 
to increase wages constituted an unlawful promise of benefit); Gen. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 627, 
637 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that a promise of a postelection gift constituted an unlawful promise of 
benefit). 
 117. See Cal. Acrylic Indus., Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 41, 63 (1996) (finding that the employer violated 
the Act where it videotaped meetings between employees and union representatives). 
 118. See NLRB v. V & S Schuler Eng’g, Inc., 309 F.3d 362, 371 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that the 
employer violated the Act by soliciting grievances when he had not done so before, creating a 
“compelling inference that he is implicitly promising to correct those inequities . . . mak[ing] union 
representation unnecessary” (quoting Orbit Lightspeed Courier Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. 380, 393 (1997))). 
 119. Wis-Pak, 125 F.3d at 522, 524–25 (finding that favorable changes to overtime and attendance 
policies constituted an unlawful grant of benefits). 
 120. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969) (upholding the NLRB’s power to order 
the employer to bargain with the union where the employer’s unfair labor practices are so severe that 
ordering a new election is not an adequate remedy, and where the union can demonstrate previous 
majority support). A bargaining order is an NLRB mandate requiring a company to “cease and desist 
from their unfair labor practices, to offer reinstatement and back pay to the employees who had been 
discriminatorily discharged, to bargain with the union on request, and to post the appropriate notices.” 
Id. at 614. 
 121. As long as informing employees of the consequences does not rise to the level of a threat. 
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2010). Employers typically raise some or all of the following issues, based in part 
on advice from counsel and from their unique circumstances, industry, and employee demographics: 
whether unions may “guarantee” increased pay, benefits, or anything else; how collective bargaining 
really works; what happens when strikes are called or picketing is conducted; what it costs to be a 
union member in terms of dues and initiation fees; where that money goes, how it is used, and by 
whom; whether the union’s leaders are trustworthy and capable; the employer’s record of 
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and will require all employees to attend so-called “captive audience” 
speeches,122 will send letters home,123 and will spend significant time and 
money on communicating their message, often employing law firms and 
consulting firms that specialize in crafting anti-union campaign 
strategies.124 Management may mandate attendance at their meetings.125 
Unions may not hold captive-audience speeches126 and, in fact, have no 
right to come onto an employer’s property.127 Unions are, however, 
entitled to a list of eligible employees128 and, unlike employers, no rule 
prohibits unions from making promises, interrogating employees, or 
soliciting grievances.129 Both sides may lie to employees but may not 
provide the employees with forgeries intended to deceive.130 
 
responsiveness to employee issues; the fact that employees will be paying someone to do what they 
may have been able to do (represent themselves) for free; whether the organizing drive has actually 
been beneficial in the sense that it has called attention to problems that need to be addressed whether 
the union is there or not; and whether the employer should make management changes (because an 
organizing drive seems to have been triggered by a perceived lack of leadership). See Arch Stokes, 
Robert L. Murphy, Paul E. Wagner & David S. Sherwyn, How Unions Organize New Hotels Without 
an Employee Ballot: Neutrality Agreements, 42 Cornell Hospitality Q. 86 (2001). 
 122. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, 
Wages, and Union Organizing 73 tbl.8 (2000) (finding that, of four hundred union campaigns 
studied, 92% included captive-audience meetings). 
 123. Id. However, in-person visits by management to employees’ homes are per se prohibited. See 
Gen. Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). The union, on the other hand, may make home visits, as 
long as those visits are not threatening or coercive. Cf. Simo v. Union of Needletrades, 322 F.3d 602, 
620–21 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing Supreme Court and NLRB cases suggesting that union home visits 
are permissible). 
 124. See Kate Bronfenbrenner et al., Introduction, in Organizing to Win: New Research on 
Union Strategies 1, 4 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998). 
 125. See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406 (1953); see also Estlund, supra note 8, at 
1536–37. 
 126. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958) (stating, of captive-
audience speeches, that unions are not “entitled to use a medium of communication simply because 
the employer is using it”); see also Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. at 406. 
 127. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 535 (1992); see also Republic Aviation Corp. v. 
NLRB, 342 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945) (finding rules against solicitation during work hours 
presumptively valid); cf. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1955) (creating an 
exception to the rule that an employer may bar nonemployee union members from the employer’s 
property when the location of the employees’ workplace and homes make reasonable nontrespassory 
efforts ineffective); Supervalu Holdings, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 425, 425 (2006) (finding a no-distribution 
rule invalid because it was enforced discriminatorily against union activity); Dillon Cos., 340 N.L.R.B. 
1260, 1260 (2003) (finding unlawful a no-solicitation rule that was previously unenforced but 
resurrected at the beginning of the union’s campaign). 
 128. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239–40 (1966) (establishing the disclosure 
requirement); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767 (1969) (affirming the Excelsior rule). 
 129. Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1311 (1977); Shirlington Supermarket, 
Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 666, 667 (1953). But see Stericycle, Inc., 37 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 2010-2011 NLRB Dec. 
¶ 15,471 (Aug. 23, 2011) (holding that a union could not initiate litigation during the critical period). 
 130. See Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982) (“[W]e will no longer probe into 
the truth or falsity of the parties’ campaign statements, and . . . we will not set elections aside on the 
basis of misleading campaign statements. We will, however, intervene in cases where a party has used 
forged documents which render the voters unable to recognize propaganda for what it is.”); see also 
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Employers could argue that the ability to interact socially with 
employees provides unions with a level playing field (at worst), and a 
significant advantage (at best). Not surprisingly, unions often hold a very 
different view of campaigns. Union advocates contend that the reason for 
labor’s failure to organize, and the consequential drop in union density, 
is that the rules of organizing unfairly favor employers.131 The assumption 
is that employers intimidate employees and either violate the law with 
impunity because there is no real enforcement, or act within the law 
because objectionable and effective conduct is not unlawful, but should 
be. Indeed, union advocates claim that during most campaigns, 
employers illegally threaten, intimidate, and terminate employees who 
favor the union.132 According to a 2005 report by the University of Illinois 
at Chicago’s Center for Urban Economic Development, when faced with 
organizing drives, 30% of employers fire pro-union workers, 49% 
threaten to close a worksite if the union prevails, and 51% coerce 
workers into opposing unions with bribery or favoritism.133 Unions point 
to the numerous unfair-labor-practice charges filed against employers, to 
evidence suggesting a connection between meritorious unfair-labor-
practice charges filed and a lower likelihood of union election victories,134 
and to anecdotal evidence of outrageous employer behavior, and 
contend that because unions lose numerous elections, the system is 
unfair. 
Others advance the related theory that employers pose stronger 
resistance to unions by pressing on the weak spots in the law and that the 
law has responded inadequately.135 According to Paul Weiler: 
[T]he employer . . . will be tempted to utilize a variety of measures 
designed to make collective bargaining unpalatable to its employees: a 
vigorous campaign against the union in which management regularly 
raises the spectre of strikes and job losses, and adds credibility to the 
 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 266 N.L.R.B. 507, 507–08 (1983); Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-
Based Legislation to Address Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 Comp. Lab. 
L. & Pol’y J. 209, 209 (2008). 
 131. See William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification Elections: Law 
and Reality Once Again, 36 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 560, 570–71 (1983) (concluding that employers’ 
captive-audience speeches have statistically significant effects on voting in union-certification 
elections). 
 132. Id.; see Bronfenbrenner, supra note 122, at 73 tbl.8. 
 133. Chirag Mehta & Nik Theodore, Am. Rights at Work, Undermining the Right to 
Organize: Employer Behavior During Union Representation Campaigns 5, 9 (2005); accord 
Bronfenbrenner, supra note 122, at 73 tbl.8 (reporting similarly staggering statistics, including that, of 
employers in 400 union campaigns, 34% used bribes or special favors, 48% made unlawful promises of 
improvement, and 25% discharged union activists); Bronfenbrenner et al., supra note 124, at 1, 4–5. 
 134. See Ferguson, supra note 77, at 15 tbl.6 (finding that meritorious unfair labor practice charges 
filed by unions against employers had a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of unions 
winning elections, reducing the success rate by 52%). 
 135. Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law 
111 (1990). 
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threats through selective discriminatory action against key union 
supporters. If the union wins the election nonetheless, the employer 
will simply carry on its resistance at the next stage by stonewalling at 
the bargaining table, forcing the union members out on strike, and 
hiring permanent replacements to fill their jobs . . . .136 
Weiler cites as evidence the increase of discriminatory discharges 
and bad faith bargaining during the period of decline in union density.137 
Craver contends that employers engage in tactics during organizing 
drives that chill employees from voicing pro-union opinions and 
regularly hire labor consultants to strategize the anti-unionization 
campaign.138 They openly encourage dissatisfied union workers to file 
decertification petitions, contributing to the jump from 300 
decertification elections in the 1960s to 900 in the early 1980s.139 Given 
the choice, companies will prefer to invest in their nonunion plants rather 
than their union plants (which explains the growth of production plants in 
the Sunbelt—where workers are less supportive of labor organizations).140 
Similarly, Richard Freeman and Morris Kleiner analyzed employer and 
organizer surveys and concluded that employers’ brazen opposition to 
unionization contributed to union decline.141 They based this conclusion 
on the finding that supervisor opposition to unionization was the most 
significant determinant of representation-election outcomes.142 
Other scholars argue that fundamental macroeconomic changes, 
like globalization, do much to explain the decline.143 Kate 
Bronfenbrenner advances a combined theory of increased capital 
mobility and increased employer opposition.144 She explains that 
employers have greater ability and willingness to close plants and 
outsource those activities, or to threaten to do so.145 Between this and 
 
 136. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 137. Id. at 112. 
 138. Charles A. Craver, Can Unions Survive? The Rejuvenation of the American Labor 
Movement 49 (1993). 
 139. Id. at 50. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of Union 
Organizing Drives, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 351, 364 (1990). 
 142. Id. at 361. Interestingly, Freeman and Kleiner also found that the use of unfair campaign 
tactics by employers is positively correlated with the odds that the union will win, in seeming 
contradiction to the assertions of some union advocates. Id.; accord Julius G. Getman, Explaining the 
Fall of the Labor Movement, 41 St. Louis Univ. L.J. 575, 582 (1997) (acknowledging that his own 
research uncovered no relationship between employer success and illegal tactics). This finding is also 
at odds with recent findings by John-Paul Ferguson that nonmeritorious unfair-labor-practice charges 
had little impact on election results as compared to meritorious ones, which significantly decreased the 
odds that unions would win. Ferguson, supra note 77, at 18. 
 143. Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 3, 6 (1993) (attributing the decline in part to the rise of competitive product markets). 
 144. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 122, at 53. 
 145. Id. 
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other employer anti-union tactics, employers are extremely effective at 
avoiding unionization.146 
Employers and some scholars argue that unions have nothing left to 
sell to employees147 because traditional labor-management relations 
simply do not serve employees’ interests148 and unions are perceived as 
less trustworthy due to their inability to carry through on promises 
made.149 Others attribute the drop in union density to internal union 
weaknesses.150  
We contend that organized labor has failed to adapt with the times, 
and part of this failure is due to unions’ failure to connect to a new 
generation of workers. Younger workers may aspire less to be lifetime 
employees with great benefits and job security and more to be like 
management, independent contractors, entrepreneurs, inventors, or 
someone who attains celebrity status and avoids work for the rest of her 
life. Others have argued that collective employment rights have been 
eclipsed by the staggering enactment of legislation protecting individual 
employee rights.151 Some point to shifts in the U.S. economy, in particular 
that it is moving towards an “enterprise based” system of industrial 
relations in private industry in which unions negotiate with single firms 
instead of with corporations or industries.152 Such shifts preclude the kind 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. According to management-side labor lawyers, one of the key strategies in this regard is to 
examine what the union is selling and to explain to the employees that the costs outweigh the benefits. 
One problem for the unions, according to some, is that organized labor does not always have much to 
sell. For example, one lawyer discussed a union-organizing drive in which the union represented to 
employees that it would demand that the employer implement the union’s health insurance plan if it 
were elected. The union extolled the fact that it would insist that the employer pay 100% of the cost of 
the plan, as opposed to their current plan under which the employees paid a portion of the cost. The 
employer held a meeting in which it compared the two plans side-by-side. While the union plan did not 
feature any up-front costs, the coverage was clearly so inferior that the employees concluded that they 
were better off with the employer plan and voted against the union. Employers contend that this 
insurance issue is a typical example of the current state of union organizing: at first, the union pitch 
sounds great, but after close examination the employees do not want to buy what the union is selling. 
Employers could argue that this is one reason why companies are able to defeat unions in elections. 
 148. Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 56 (1999) (finding a desire 
among employees for an organization run “jointly” by both labor and management). 
 149. See supra note 147. 
 150. Bronfenbrenner et al. suggested that unions focused too little effort on recruitment during the 
1970s and 1980s and failed to adapt their organizing strategies to new challenges. Bronfenbrenner et 
al., supra note 124, at 5–6. Julius Getman agrees that unions’ failure to adapt their thinking 
contributed to the demise, and points to other internal weaknesses: internal politics, inability to 
coordinate with other locals, corruption, and a divide between leadership and rank-and-file 
employees. See Getman, supra note 142, at 583–93. 
 151. Michael J. Piore & Sean Safford, Changing Regimes of Workplace Governance, Shifting Axes 
of Social Mobilization, and the Challenge to Industrial Relations Theory, 45 Indus. Rel. 319, 301–04 
(2006). 
 152. Ronald W. Schatz, From Commons to Dunlop: Rethinking the Field and Theory of Industrial 
Relations, in Industrial Democracy in America: The Ambiguous Promise 87, 88 (Nelson 
Lichtenstein & Howell John Harris eds., 1993). 
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of industrial democracy and industrial stability based on unionism that 
industrial-relations theorists and union advocates have contemplated.153 
Still others mark the advent of enlightened human-resource policies as 
explaining labor’s inability to organize and the drop in union density.154 
In fact, management often contends that simply informing employees of 
the “truth” will allow them to prevail.155 Therefore, employers argue that 
the system is fair because the lack of union density reflects the will of the 
people. These theories are consistent with the staggering decline in 
public support for unions.156 Unionists argue that the statistics prove that 
the system is unfair.157 We contend that the system is unfair not because 
of the results, but because of the process.158 
Like the Sherwyn-versus-Eigen hypothetical one-on-one basketball 
game described above, the current system has two different sets of rules 
for the two sides. Employers have the advantage of access to employees. 
Captive-audience meetings and other impromptu conversations allow 
employers to get their respective messages across. Unions have the 
advantage of being able to make promises, visit employees’ homes, and 
party with the employees. Employers have the inherent power 
advantage, while unions often have a head start in the race to the 
election. There are some rules that apply to both sides. Both sides can lie 
to the employees, trash the other side, and pressure the employees to 
vote one way or the other.159 The result is that at the end of the campaign, 
the employees feel like the rope in a tug of war. The employees likely 
have little, if any, ability to gauge the accuracy of the information 
received; they often fear reprisals for voting for either side, and they 
likely feel like pawns in the age-old labor-versus-capital dispute where 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Jack Fiorito & Cheryl L. Maranto, The Contemporary Decline of Union Strength, Contemp. 
Pol’y Issues, Oct. 1987, at 12, 16–17. 
 155. Surveys of union organizers and employees who have been through NLRB election 
campaigns seem to confirm this trend, at least indirectly. See, e.g., Workers Weigh in on Alleged 
Coercion During Card Check Campaign and NLRB Elections, Am. Rights at Work (Mar. 21, 2006) 
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/press-center/2006-press-releases/workers-weigh-in-on-alleged-
coercion-during-card-check-campaigns-and-nlrb-elections-20060320-239-345-345.html. 
 156. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 157. There are those who go beyond the statistics and make a normative assessment of the NLRA, 
arguing that it is biased in favor of employers. However, these analyses tend to omit or undervalue the 
advantages the Act accords unions and to emphasize the advantages accorded employers. See, e.g., 
Getman, supra note 142, at 578–84. 
 158. Others, a rare minority by our account of the current state of this relevant scholarship, have 
suggested that systemic factors potentially account for a greater percentage of variation in win rates 
and union density than do the other factors described above. See Ferguson, supra note 77, at 18; Chris 
Riddell, Union Certification Success Under Voting Versus Card-Check Procedures: Evidence from 
British Columbia, 1978–1998, 57 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 493, 495 (2004). 
 159. Note well that all of this can be done without engaging in, for example, threats, interrogation, 
or recording campaign activity—tactics that neither management nor the union can employ. See supra 
notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
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their desires are subordinated to the desires of two large entities each 
claiming to care about employee well-being more than the other: 
Management swears that it learned a lesson from the experience and 
vows to change, while the union swears that no change management 
might implement would remain intact without the perpetual threat of 
organization attainable only by certifying the union as the employees’ 
representative.160 
C. Card-Check Neutrality Agreements and the Employee Free 
Choice Act 
Perhaps the most discussed means of reforming the broken, 
outdated means of selecting workplace labor organization representation 
is card-check neutrality. This was most recently embodied, in part, in the 
proposed Employee Free Choice Act.161 The logic behind EFCA focuses 
(incorrectly in our view) on results, not process, and in the end, would 
attenuate perhaps the most critical component of the process’s fairness—
employees’ right to freely choose their representative or to choose not to 
be represented at all. With respect to neutrality agreements, five 
questions must be addressed: (1) what are they, (2) what effect do they 
have on unionization, (3) why do employers sign them, (4) what is their 
legal status, and (5) do they result in a fair system under our newly 
described criteria. We address the first four questions in this Part, and 
the fairness question in Part IV. 
1.  What Are Neutrality Agreements? 
Although neutrality agreements come in several forms, the common 
denominator for all of them is that employers agree to remain neutral 
with regard to the union’s attempt to organize the workforce.162 Some 
agreements simply state that the employer will remain neutral but 
contain no specific provisions, while other agreements are more 
detailed.163 For example, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees 
 
 160. Levitt, supra note 96, at 89. 
 161. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Congress (2009). As discussed above, EFCA 
provides for recognition based on card checks, see supra text accompanying notes 17–18, but does not 
require employer neutrality. 
 162. While most agreements contain a definition of neutrality, the definitions vary widely. Most 
Communication Workers of America, United Auto Workers, and United Steelworkers of America 
agreements define neutrality as “neither helping nor hindering” the union’s organizing effort, yet still 
allow employers to communicate facts to the employees. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union 
Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, 55 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 42, 47 (2001). A 
different approach is apparent from the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union agreements that 
prohibit the employer from communicating any opposition to the union. Id. Less typical definitions 
provide that management will make an affirmative statement to their employees that it welcomes their 
choice of a representative. Id. 
 163. Agreements may state that the employer will not attack or demean the union; the employer 
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Union agreements stated that employers would not “communicate 
opposition” to the union’s efforts.164 
Neutrality agreements commonly give the union access to 
employees in the form of a list of their names and addresses (and, 
sometimes, telephone numbers), as well as permission to come onto 
company property during work hours for the purpose of collecting 
authorization cards.165 This differs from the guidelines established by the 
NLRB and the courts, under which an employer has no obligation to 
provide the union with such sweeping access to its employees, and may 
actually be prohibited from doing so.166 
Finally, most neutrality agreements include a “card check” 
provision, which requires the employer to recognize the union if a 
majority of the bargaining-unit employees sign authorization cards.167 
Under a card-check agreement, the employees do not vote for the union 
in a secret-ballot election monitored by the NLRB.168 Instead, the 
employer recognizes the union if it presents the company with the 
requisite number of signed authorization cards, at which point the 
neutrality agreement is no longer needed and expires.169 
2.  What Effect Do Neutrality Agreements Have on Unionization? 
Neutrality agreements radically change the landscape of union 
organizing. With the aid of such agreements, unions in one study 
prevailed in 78% of the situations in which they attempted to organize, 
compared to only a 46% success rate in contested elections.170 The 
difference between 46% and 78% actually understates the effect of the 
neutrality agreement, in part because the sampled populations for the 
two figures are different. Elections only occur when the union can show 
that 30% of the employees have signed authorization cards.171 As stated 
above, however, in almost every situation where a union goes to election, 
 
will not refer to the union as a third party; the parties will strive to create a campaign free of fear, 
hostility, and coercion; the parties will campaign in a positive manner; the parties will keep their 
statements pro-company or pro-union; and the employer will not state that it is corporate policy to 
avoid unionization. See id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Arch Stokes, Robert L. Murphy, Paul E. Wagner & David S. Sherwyn, Neutrality Agreements: 
How Unions Organize New Hotels Without an Employee Ballot, Cornell Hotel & Rest. Admin. Q., 
Oct.–Nov. 2001, at 86, 89. 
 166. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 534 (1992). 
 167. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 162, at 47 tbl.1 (finding that 73% of neutrality agreements 
studied had card-check language). 
 168. Stokes et al., supra note 165, at 86. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 162, at 52 & tbl.3; see also Riddell, supra note 158, at 509 
(finding a union success-rate difference of approximately 19% in British Columbia attributable to 
card-check procedures as compared to mandatory-voting procedures). 
 171. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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it has more than 50% of the employees sign cards.172 Thus, the sampled 
population in the 46% win figure includes only companies where it is 
likely that at least 60% of the employees signed cards. Companies where 
the union could not get at least 51% of the employees to sign cards did 
not go to election and never became part of that figure. Conversely, the 
sampled population in the neutrality side of the study includes all 
employers who signed such agreements. Those employers whose 
employees had no interest represent the 22% of companies that remained 
nonunion. In other words, it is likely that 100% of the companies that 
went to election would have been unionized under a neutrality with card 
check, and the 22% of those under card-check agreements would never 
have gone to election. The net effect is quite simple. Assuming there is 
enough employee interest to warrant an election in the first place, the 
company’s chances of becoming unionized are less than 50% under the 
NLRB’s election procedures and nearly guaranteed under a neutrality 
agreement with a card-check provision. 
It follows that employers wishing to remain nonunion or to give 
their employees an opportunity to exercise their right to choose their 
elected representative by secret ballot should refuse to sign a neutrality 
agreement. This begs the question of why an employer would ever 
accede to a neutrality agreement. 
3.  Why Do Employers Sign Neutrality Agreements? 
The question “why do employers sign neutrality agreements?” is 
perplexing to the casual observer. The answer is fairly simple. Employers 
sign neutrality agreements because they have to or because it makes 
business sense. There are two reasons why employers have to sign 
neutrality agreements. First, local governments may require neutrality 
agreements. For example, San Francisco enacted a labor-peace 
ordinance that required neutrality to get a building permit or to do 
business at the airport or other city-owned property.173 Other cities have 
had similar such requirements.174 Historically, there has been little public 
opposition to such requirements and even fewer legal challenges. 
Second, employers who are parties to certain collective-bargaining 
agreements must agree to a neutrality agreement. For example, the 
collective-bargaining agreements covering the hotel employers’ 
associations in New York City and Chicago contain neutrality 
agreements.175 Because the major brands and operators are all parties to 
 
 172. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Michael Reich et al., Inst. Indus. Rel., Living Wages and Economic Performance: 
The San Francisco Airport Model, at 7 (2003). 
 174. For example, there is a similar ordinance in Los Angeles County. See L.A. Cnty., Cal., 
Admin. Code § 2.201.050 (2011).  
 175. These agreements are on file with the Authors. 
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these agreements, any new owner who wishes to use an established 
operator or brand must agree to neutrality. 
Of course, the next question is why the brands and operators agreed 
to neutrality. While it is difficult to state with authority why employers 
agreed to something so long ago, one can make some logical 
assumptions. Neutrality is a huge gain for the union, and unions should 
and do give up other demands in exchange for neutrality. An owner who 
does not plan on owning another hotel has no disincentive and, in fact, 
has an incentive to force the other brands and operators to sign 
neutrality agreements. During negotiations, the union’s willingness to 
trade wage increases, for example, for neutrality has an immediate 
positive effect on current owners. In addition, it has a long-term positive 
effect. Now, if a brand opens a competing hotel, the unionized owner 
knows the new hotel likely will be union and, thus, the playing field will 
be level.176 
Other times, neutrality simply makes business sense. For example, 
SBC Communications, a telephone company, and the Communications 
Workers of America entered into an agreement in which the parties 
executed neutrality agreements that included card checks for all current 
SBC employees and those employed by all firms acquired by SBC in the 
future.177 SBC accepted the neutrality agreement in exchange for the 
union’s promise to lobby on the company’s behalf regarding antitrust 
complications arising out of present and future mergers and 
acquisitions.178 Put simply, the company was willing, for all intents and 
purposes, to accept that all of its present and future employees would 
have one union as their exclusive representative in exchange for the 
union’s lobbying assistance. While it may have been a good deal for the 
 
 176. See Morris A. Horowitz, The New York Hotel Industry: A Labor Relations Study 30 
(1960) (“It was unquestionably becoming clear to the Hotel Association [of New York City], at this 
point, that with the growing strength of the unions, it was only a matter of time before a significant 
number of hotels would settle with any of the various unions in the field. If this happened, different 
hotels would deal with different unions on different terms, and . . . it would be most impractical to 
have different wage scales among competitive hotels. . . . [A] uniform union structure in all the hotels 
would be economically advantageous to the hotels . . . .”). 
 177. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 163, at 44; Harry C. Katz et al., The Revitalization of the CWA: 
Integrating Collective Bargaining, Political Action, and Organizing, 56 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 573, 
586–87 (2003). 
 178. Katz et al., supra note 177, at 587; see also Interview with Harry C. Katz, Dean and Professor 
of Collective Bargaining, Cornell Univ. Sch. of Indus. & Lab. Rel., in Ithaca, N.Y. (July 23, 2001); 
CWA Tells FCC: Bell Atlantic-GTE, SBC-Ameritech Mergers Will Boost Competition and Benefit All 
Consumers, Comm. Workers of Am. (Dec. 13, 1998), http://www.cwa-union.org/news/entry/ 
cwa_tells_fcc_bell_atlantic-gte_sbc-ameritech_mergers_will_boost_competitio (illustrating the antitrust 
lobbying the CWA performed on behalf of SBC); Justice Dept. Approves SBC-Ameritech Deal, Comm. 
Workers of Am. (Apr. 1, 1999), http://www.cwa-union.org/news/entry/justice_dept._approves_sbc-
ameritech_deal (same). 
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employer, and it certainly was a great deal for the union, the employees 
were deprived of information and choice. 
4.  What Is the Legal Status of Neutrality Agreements? 
In assessing the legality of neutrality one needs to distinguish 
between that required by government and that entered into by private 
employers. The former may be unlawful; the latter is not. 
a. Government-Mandated Neutrality 
The legality of government-mandated neutrality suffered its first 
serious blow in 2001 when Judge Vaughn Walker of the District Court 
for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction 
that prevented the San Francisco International Airport from enforcing 
its labor-peace and card-check rules against an employer who operated 
at the airport.179 The court held that the airport’s labor-peace rule was 
unenforceable because it likely conflicted with the so-called preemption 
principle of the NLRA,180 which prohibits state and local regulation of 
activities that the NLRA “protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or 
prohibits.”181 Accordingly, a city, state, or local statute, regulation, or 
ordinance that conflicts or interferes with the disposition of issues under 
the NLRA is unenforceable.182 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Brown, handed down 
by the Supreme Court in 2008, further calls the legality of government-
mandated neutrality into serious doubt.183 In Brown, the Court struck 
down a California statute that prohibited employers who did business 
with the state from using state funds to “assist, promote, or deter union 
organizing.”184 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 7–2 majority that 
reversed the en banc Ninth Circuit, held that the NLRA preempted the 
state statute, relying on a different but related preemption doctrine from 
that relied on by Judge Walker.185 According to the Court, the Labor 
Management Relations Act (the “Taft-Hartley Act”),186 a law passed to 
level the playing field of the pro-union NLRA, manifested a 
“congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor 
 
 179. Aeroground, Inc. v. City of S.F., 170 F. Supp. 2d 950, 959 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
 180. Id. at 955–56 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)).  
 181. Wis. Dept. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986). 
 182. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244–45 (1959). 
 183. 554 U.S. 60, 74 (2008). 
 184. Id. at 71–74 (quoting Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 16645.1–.8 (2010)). 
 185. Id. at 76; Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 
150–51 (1976) (“[A] regulation by the state is impermissible because it ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” (quoting Hill v. 
Florida, 324 U.S. 538, 542 (1945))). 
 186. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“Taft-Hartley Act”), Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2010)). 
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and management.”187 The Court found both explicit and implicit 
congressional intent to leave noncoercive employer speech unregulated 
because it is impermissible to “chill[] one side of ‘the robust debate 
which has been protected under the NLRA.’”188 
Although labor-peace statutes differ in some respects from the 
statute at issue in Brown,189 they raise many of the same concerns. The 
statutes deny employees the “implie[d] . . . underlying right” to 
information opposing unionization and discourage free debate of labor-
management issues by stifling one side of the dialogue.190 Labor-peace 
statutes thus embody state policies on organizing—policies that “stand[] 
as an obstacle” to the policy Congress pronounced on that issue in the 
Taft-Hartley Act.191 
Even more on point is Judge Richard Posner’s decision in 
Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce v. Milwaukee 
County.192 In Metropolitan Milwaukee, the Seventh Circuit struck down a 
Milwaukee ordinance that required certain transportation contractors to 
negotiate neutrality agreements as a condition to receiving payment from 
the county.193 The ordinance required that these agreements include 
clauses subjecting labor disputes to binding arbitration, prohibiting 
employers from holding captive-audience speeches and expressing “false 
or misleading” information intended to influence an employee’s vote, 
and requiring the employer to provide the union with an employee 
contact list and “timely and reasonable access” to the workplace.194 The 
court held that a state may regulate labor relations with its contractors 
only for limited purposes, such as increasing the quality or reducing the 
cost of the services performed.195 However, a state may not regulate labor 
relations to promote a policy it views as superior to that embodied in the 
NLRA.196 
 
 187. Brown, 554 U.S. at 67 (quoting Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 1114, 383 
U.S. 53, 62 (1966)). 
 188. Id. at 73 (quoting Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 
U.S. 264, 275 (1974)); see also Healthcare Ass’n. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Pataki, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6, 25 
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (striking down, as preempted by the NLRA, N.Y. Lab. L. § 211-a (McKinney 2004), 
which prohibited use of state funds to “encourage or discourage union organization”), rev’d, 471 F.3d 
87, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversing grant of summary judgment based on the presence of fact issues, but 
accepting the lower court’s determination that the NLRA might preempt the New York statute). 
 189. For example, the statute at issue in Brown arguably was even more pro-union in that it 
permitted the use of funds toward expenses in connection with allowing union representatives access 
to the employer’s premises or “[n]egotiating, entering into, or carrying out a voluntary recognition 
agreement.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 16647 (2010).  
 190. 554 U.S. at 68. 
 191. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 150 (quoting Hill v. Florida, 324 U.S. 538, 542 (1945)). 
 192. 431 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 193. Id. at 277–78. 
 194. Cnty. of Milwaukee, Wis., Code Gen. Ordinances § 31.02(f) (2000). 
 195. Metro. Milwaukee, 431 F.3d at 277–78. 
 196. Id. at 278–79. The county argued in the alternative that the scheme was not regulation, but 
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b. Private Neutrality Agreements 
There are three arguments why private neutrality agreements 
violate the law: (1) section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act makes it unlawful 
for an employer to give or agree to give a “thing of value” to any labor 
organization and for a labor organization to receive a thing of value from 
any employer,197 (2) the Taft-Hartley Act allows employers the right to 
campaign against the union,198 and (3) the NLRA prohibits so-called 
“company unions.”199 Below we first describe why a private neutrality 
agreement violates the law. We then describe how the courts and the 
NLRB have ruled on these issues. 
The first question is whether a neutrality agreement itself 
constitutes a thing of value provided to a labor organization. Courts use a 
seemingly broad interpretation of “thing of value” in section 302. For 
instance, in United States v. Schiffman, the question before the court was 
whether the request for a reduced room rate constituted a thing of value 
and thus violated section 302.200 In that case, a union official who 
represented a bargaining unit at a Hyatt property in Florida requested 
that an Atlanta Hyatt provide the official with a room rate that was 
almost 50% less than Hyatt’s corporate rate.201 The court found that the 
room-rate reduction was a thing of value and that the requested favor 
violated section 302.202 Similarly, in United States v. Boffa, the court 
found that an employer unlawfully provided a thing of value when it 
provided a union official with the use of a 1975 Lincoln Continental 
without charge for a four-month period.203 This broad definition of “thing 
of value” in section 302 is consistent with the judicial interpretation of 
the same term when it is found in other statutes.204 Those holdings suggest 
 
allocation of state funds. However, the court held that express regulation versus the use of the county’s 
spending power was “a distinction without a difference.” Id. at 279 (quoting Wis. Dep’t of Indus., 
Labor, & Human Relations. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 287 (1986)). 
 197. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2010). 
 198. 29 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2010). 
 199. Id. § 158(a)(2). 
 200. 552 F.2d 1124, 1125 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  
 203. 688 F.2d 919, 924, 936 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 204. See, e.g., United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 641, 
which prohibits embezzling, stealing, purloining, or knowingly converting “any record, voucher, 
money, or thing of value” of the U.S. or of any department of agency thereof, includes actions 
involving “intangible” property). Other federal statutes use the phrase “anything of value.” See 
18 U.S.C. § 201 (2010) (defining criminal bribery and prohibiting any person from giving or attempting 
to give “anything of value” to a government official with the intention of influencing their official 
actions and reciprocally prohibiting any public official from receiving or attempting to solicit anything 
of value in return for official action); 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2010) (imposing criminal sanctions for soliciting 
or demanding corruptly for the benefit of any person, or accepting or agreeing to accept “anything of 
value” from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, 
transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of 
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that a similarly broad interpretation would apply to a thing of value 
under section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
Neutrality agreements almost always require the employer to 
provide at least four things that have been or logically would be 
characterized by the courts as things of value under this broad definition 
of the term: access to the hotel’s premises so the union can speak to the 
employees, a list of employees, a card-check provision, and exclusivity to 
one union. If any of those are benefits that constitute a thing of value, the 
typical neutrality agreement would violate section 302 of the Taft-
Hartley Act. Indeed, it seems clear that these four items are things of 
value. As explained above, the value of the card check is significant: it 
substantially increases the likelihood of union success in an organizing 
drive.205 Similarly, access to employees, directories, and exclusive 
dealings206 are not required by the law and seemingly would help the 
union in its efforts. One would presume that significant help in 
organizing an employer—the main goal of the union—would constitute a 
thing of value.207 
The second argument that private neutrality agreements violate the 
law stems from section 7 of the NLRA, which grants employees the right 
to organize or to refrain from organizing.208 The right to refrain from 
organizing was added to the NLRA in the Taft-Hartley Act.209 To 
operationalize this right, Taft-Hartley allows employers and employees 
to file unfair-labor-practice charges against unions when the unions’ 
conduct interferes with the section 7 rights of employees,210 and gives 
employers the right to exercise free speech with regard to union 
organizing as long as they do not threaten, make promises to, interrogate, 
confer benefits on, or solicit grievances from employees.211 It seems that 
the purpose of these free-speech guarantees is to allow employees access 
 
value of $5,000 or more). 
 205. See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text. 
 206. Exclusive dealing means that only the union that was a party to the agreement, and not rival 
unions, would have access and directories. 
 207. See supra notes 173–79 and accompanying text. 
 208. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2010) (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, 
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and 
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . .”). 
 209. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 140 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157). 
 210. Id. § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2010). Prior to Taft-Hartley, unfair-labor-practice claims could 
be filed only against employers. See Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 8, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935). 
 211. Uarco, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 1, 1–2 (1974) (holding that it is not the solicitation of grievances 
itself that is coercive and violative of section 8(a)(1), but the promise to correct grievances, and that 
solicitation of grievances raises a rebuttable inference that the employer is making such a promise); 
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (“[A]n employer’s free speech right to 
communicate his views to his employees is firmly established and cannot be infringed by a union or the 
Board.”). 
Eigen & SHERWYN_21 (F. VALDEZ) (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2012 5:22 PM 
March 2012]          MORAL/CONTRACTUAL LABOR LAW REFORM 729 
to information so that they can be fully informed before deciding 
whether to organize or to refrain from organizing. Consequently, an 
employer’s decision to remain neutral seems to deprive employees of 
access to information critical of the union and thereby may interfere with 
employees’ right to refrain from unionizing. 
Finally, private neutrality agreements may violate section 8(a)(2) of 
the NLRA, which prohibits employers from assisting unions by giving 
them financial or other support, a provision that eliminated the so-called 
company unions of days past.212 Like the employers’ right to engage in 
free speech, the purpose of section 8(a)(2) is to preserve the free exercise 
of employees’ section 7 rights. Because collusion between an employer 
and a union can detrimentally affect employees by interfering with their 
rights to refrain from organizing, it would seem that a neutrality 
agreement violates section 8(a)(2). 
While there is no case on point, the NLRB’s analysis of section 
8(a)(2) supports this argument. In reviewing alleged 8(a)(2) violations, 
the NLRB has noted the Supreme Court’s direction that courts need to 
carefully scrutinize “all factors, often subtle, which restrain an 
employee’s choice and for which the employer may be said to be 
responsible.”213 Under this totality-of-the-circumstances test, the NLRB 
has found that the following factors may constitute evidence of a 
violation of section 8(a)(2): the employer’s introducing the union to its 
employees, the employer’s permitting the union to solicit employees to 
sign cards on the employer’s property and during work hours, the 
employer’s extending recognition to a union that had not collected valid 
recognition cards, and the employer’s executing a collective-bargaining 
agreement before the union had demonstrated that it represented an 
uncoerced majority of employees.214 Moreover, the NLRB has found that 
“signed cards . . . cannot be considered reliable representation of 
employee sentiments when there is evidence of the employer’s assistance 
to the union.”215 
While allowing a union the use of company time and property is not 
a per se violation of section 8(a)(2),216 that factor in addition to the fact 
that the employer has chosen which union it will introduce to its 
employees, along with the other neutrality requirements described 
 
 212. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2010) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to 
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute 
financial or other support to it . . . .”). 
 213. Windsor Place Corp., 276 N.L.R.B. 445, 448 (1985) (citing Int’l Ass’n of Machinists Lodge No. 
35 v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1946)). 
 214. Windsor Place Corp., 276 N.L.R.B. at 449. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 448 (citing Manuela Mfg. Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 379 (1963)). 
Eigen & SHERWYN_21 (F. VALDEZ) (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2012 5:22 PM 
730 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:695 
above, compels the conclusion that such agreements violate section 
8(a)(2).217 
Despite the above arguments, the NLRB and the federal courts 
consistently uphold neutrality agreements. In Hotel Employees and 
Restaurant Employees, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Resources, LLC, the 
Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether a neutrality agreement was 
a “thing of value.”218 In three short paragraphs devoid of any real 
analysis, the court rejected the thing-of-value argument.219 The basis for 
this rejection was the court’s interpretation of the purposes of the statute 
and the effect of neutrality agreements.220 According to the court, the 
prohibition against providing a thing of value was passed “to prevent 
employers from tampering with the loyalty of union officials and to 
prevent union officials from extorting tribute from employers.”221 This 
prohibition, the court continued, is limited to bribery, extortion, and 
other corrupt practices conducted in secret and only addresses 
agreements to pay, loan, or deliver any money or thing of value.222 The 
court then held that a neutrality agreement benefited both parties with 
efficiencies and cost savings and did not involve the payment, loan, or 
delivery of anything.223 
This analysis is woefully lacking in an understanding of the relevant 
case law and of the nature of labor relations. For example, the reduced 
hotel room rate in Schiffman was neither bribery, nor extortion, nor 
corruption. Moreover, it did not involve the payment, loan, or delivery of 
anything. What it did do, rather, was create a situation where the union 
official may have felt indebted to the employer, arguably hindering his 
ability to fully represent the employees. We dispute that a savings of $20 
would have such an effect, but the court held it could.224 On the other 
hand, a neutrality agreement granting exclusive collective-bargaining 
rights to one union could result in dues of $35 to $50 per month from 
thousands of employees. Hundreds of thousands of dollars per month 
seems like a thing of value. Would a union, for example, give up its 
demands for increases in wages or health and safety measures in 
exchange for that kind of money and power? Of course it would. In fact, 
that is exactly what UNITE-HERE did in the summer of 2006 when it 
 
 217. Moreover, under a neutrality agreement, employers recognize unions based on signatures that 
result from employer assistance to the union. Those cards should not be considered reliable and the 
NLRB should not certify the union. 
 218. 390 F.3d 206, 218 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 219. Id. at 218–19. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. (quoting Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th 
Cir. 1979)). 
 222. Id. at 219. 
 223. Id. 
 224. United States v. Schiffman, 552 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir. 1977). 
Eigen & SHERWYN_21 (F. VALDEZ) (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2012 5:22 PM 
March 2012]          MORAL/CONTRACTUAL LABOR LAW REFORM 731 
threatened an industry-wide strike if employers did not agree to 
neutrality agreements and reduced demands that would have benefited 
the current employees in exchange for the ability to organize nonunion 
hotels.225 This seems like what section 302 was designed to prevent. The 
courts, however, do not agree. In fact, the Fourth Circuit226 and at least 
two federal district courts227 followed Sage Hospitality. In addition, in 
Dana Corporation, the NLRB followed Sage Hospitality, holding that 
card-check neutrality furthers the NLRA’s purpose of promoting labor 
peace.228 In other words, an agreement that is provided at the expense of 
current members’ wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment 
and that jeopardizes the employees’ section 7 right to refrain from 
joining a union is permissible as long as it furthers labor peace.  
We believe that card-check neutrality agreements violate section 
302 and the NLRA and therefore should not be enforced. Our belief, 
however, does not reflect the current state of the law and thus, for the 
time being, neutrality agreements are alive and well. 
D. Legislative and Adjudicative Initiatives 
EFCA would have put part of the section 302 issue to rest because it 
would have mandated employers to recognize unions as the exclusive 
representative of petitioned-for units of employees on the basis of signed 
authorization cards from a majority of employees in those units.229 The 
midterm elections destroyed any chance of this statute being passed 
during President Obama’s first term. While the passage of EFCA may no 
longer be viable, its aftereffects remain on both sides of the table. The 
concept of “free choice” ending the process of secret-ballot elections was 
an anomaly that not only doomed the statute, but that also resulted in 
proposed state legislation that would outlaw card checks. In November 
of 2010, voters in four states—Arizona, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
and Utah—voted to amend their state constitutions to require secret-
ballot elections for union certification.230 The NLRB has taken the 
position that these amendments are preempted by the NLRA and thus 
 
 225. Richard W. Hurd, Neutrality Agreements: Innovative, Controversial, and Labor’s Hope for the 
Future, New Lab. Forum, Spring 2008, at 35, 36–37; David Sherwyn, Zev J. Eigen & Paul Wagner, The 
Hotel Industry’s Summer of 2006: A Watershed Moment for America’s Labor Unions?, 47 Cornell 
Hotel & Rest. Admin. Q. 337, 343–45 (2006). 
 226. See Adcock v. Freightliner, LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 376 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 227. See United Steel Workers Int’l Union v. Hibbing Joint Venture, No. 06-4820, 2007 WL 
2580546, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Sept. 4, 2007); Patterson v. Heartland Indus. Partners, LLP, 428 F. Supp. 
2d 714, 724 (N.D. Ohio 2006). 
 228. 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010-2011 NLRB Dec. ¶ 15,369 (Dec. 6, 2010). 
 229. S. 560, 111th Cong., § 2(a)(6) (2009). 
 230. Ariz. Const. art. II, § 37; S.C. Const. art. II, § 12; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 28; Utah Const. 
art. IV, § 8(1). 
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are unenforceable.231 These issues will be played out before the NLRB 
and ultimately the courts.232 In addition, as stated above, numerous states 
are discussing right-to-work legislation.233 Currently there are twenty-
three right-to-work states.234 
On the other side of the ledger, organized labor is lobbying the 
NLRB to change its rules and shorten the time between the filing of the 
petition and the election. Commentators are proposing a time period of 
twenty, ten, or even five days between the filing of the petition and the 
election.235 Labor argues that a shortened time period would allow a 
secret-ballot election but would curtail management’s ability to threaten, 
intimidate, coerce, promise benefits to, and surveil employees.236 
There are two problems with a shortened-election scheme. First, 
assuming that a fully informed electorate is desirable, five or ten days 
simply is not enough time for management to convey its side of the story. 
Unfortunately, this is a trade-off between interests that likely cannot be 
reconciled. The second problem, however, hurts both sides. Before 
holding a union election, several issues must be resolved, the most 
difficult one being the scope of the bargaining unit. Those advocating for 
quick elections argue that a “vote now and litigate later” approach will 
sufficiently address these issues.237 This play on the classic collective-
bargaining mantra, “work now and grieve later,” will not work. 
Currently, management decides whether to contest the bargaining unit 
before the election.238 While delay can help management in the election, 
employers often consent to the proposed unit to avoid the expense of 
challenging the proposal, the risk of losing the challenge, and the 
 
 231. State Constitutional Amendments Conflict with the NLRA, NLRB (Jan. 14, 2011), 
http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/statesfactsheet.pdf.  
 232. See Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Tom Horne, Ariz. Att’y Gen. 
(Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/letter_az.pdf (threatening 
litigation); Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Alan Wilson, S.C. Att’y Gen. (Jan. 
13, 2011), available at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/letter_sc.pdf (same); Letter from 
Lafe E. Solomon, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Marty J. Jackley, S.D. Att’y Gen. (Jan. 13, 2011), available 
at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/letter_sd.pdf (same); Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, 
Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Att’y Gen. (Jan. 13, 2011), available at 
http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/letter_ut.pdf (same). 
 233. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
 234. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 235. See 155 Cong. Rec. S3, 636 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 2009) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) 
(proposing a quick-election scheme where the initial election would be held within twenty-one days of 
the filing of the petition); Implications of the Employee Free Choice Act, Metro. Corp. Counsel, Sept. 
2009, at 12. 
 236. The NLRB held a hearing on June 18 and 19 to discuss shortening the elections, where 
professionals and academics opined on the topic. See Open Meeting on Proposed Election Process 
Rules, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/openmeeting (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
 237. See Proposed Election Rule Changes, Hearing Before the NLRB 358 (July 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/525/publicmeeting07-19-11-corrected.pdf (statement of 
union-side attorney Joe Paller). 
 238. See Stokes et al., supra note 165, at 88. 
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potential of appearing obstructionist to employees. In contrast, if “vote 
now and litigate later” were the norm, once management lost, they 
would have every incentive to litigate. Management lawyers invoking the 
need for discovery, briefs, open hearing dates, and other litigation 
instruments could delay certification for months or even years. In effect, 
“vote now and litigate later” would provide employers with a legitimate 
excuse to tie up union victories in litigation for years, while under the 
current scheme employers lose credibility if they engage in such dilatory 
tactics. 
IV.  Developing a New System for Union Organizing 
As stated above, we contend that a fair system would be one in 
which employees have full information (or as full of an opportunity to 
obtain complete information as possible) and feel that during the process 
they were treated with respect and not threatened or intimidated by 
either side. The current status quo, neutrality agreements, card checks 
(with or without neutrality), and quick elections all fail to meet our 
standard. Under current NLRB rules, the sides can lie to each other, 
employees report being fired and intimidated, and each side uses its 
respective weapons to defeat the other. Neutrality and quick elections 
axiomatically expose employees to only one side of the story, and card 
check is subject to intimidation by unions.239 
It is our belief that some approach the conversation about how to 
improve the collective labor-representation election system with the 
preexisting belief that employees should be represented by a union 
(because that is what is in their best interest, whether employees realize 
it or not), and some approach the conversation with the view that 
employees should not be represented by unions (whether employees 
realize that it is in their best interest or not). Hence, some of the focus is 
on developing reform that tilts results in one direction or the other. For 
instance, the normative debate about neutrality reveals much of this 
paternalistic orientation. Some are willing to sacrifice what we believe to 
be one of the core tenets of democracy and workplace governance—
namely employees’ right to vote for their representative, or vote not to 
be represented at all—in the name of increasing union win rates, because 
of the belief that higher union density is better for everyone, including 
employers and employees, both represented and nonrepresented. 
Our mantra is that a system for electing labor organizations needs to 
be focused on what is best for voting employees, deferring to them to 
 
 239. Some union advocates laugh at the concept of union intimidation. But union organizers make 
a name for themselves and remain employed if they are successful. It is naïve to assert that a union 
organizer two cards away from victory would not be more likely to resort to intimidation or other less 
than desirous means to secure success. 
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make the decisions that directly affect them before worrying about what 
is good for the U.S. economy or other employees across town. We 
therefore endeavored to find or develop a system that would 
operationalize our core beliefs, which are summarized as follows: 
(1) unionization will benefit some employees, but will not benefit others; 
(2) some employees want a union and others do not; (3) employee 
choice, rather than achieving labor peace regardless of the cost, should 
drive policy; (4) employees should have full information, or at least the 
maximum opportunity for exposure to full information; (5) employees 
should vote in a secret-ballot election; (6) management and unions have 
corrupted the current NLRA rules so that the goal is to win and not to 
facilitate employee choice; and (7) a union organizing system will be 
successful if, regardless of the result, at its conclusion the employees feel 
they have been respected, fully informed, not intimidated, and are 
satisfied that they made the choice they wanted to make. 
A. The Principles for Ethical Conduct During Union 
Representational Campaigns 
Before developing our own system, we looked to find a proposal or 
practice that satisfied our goals. There is one. We encourage unions, 
management, and ultimately Congress to adopt the Principles for Ethical 
Conduct During Union Representational Campaigns (the “Principles”) 
developed by the Institute for Employee Choice.240 However, we raise 
some significant questions about the way in which the Principles should 
be implemented. These questions carry important consequences, more 
broadly than in the labor-management relations context, about the 
differences between positivistic legal rules and normative, sociomoral, 
self-imposed constraints as optimal means of enforcement regimes. 
The Institute for Employee Choice is the brainchild of Richard 
Bensinger and Dick Shubert. Bensinger is a long-time union organizer 
whose resume includes being the first head of organizing for the AFL-
CIO, as well as working with UNITE-HERE, the United Auto Workers 
(“UAW”), and other unions.241 Shubert is the former CEO of Bethlehem 
Steel and former Deputy Secretary of Labor under the Nixon and Ford 
administrations.242 Both men grew frustrated by the current system and 
its perverse incentives for both unions and management.243 Despite 
coming from opposite sides of a polarized issue, Bensinger and Shubert 
 
 240. Richard Bensinger & Dick Shubert, Inst. for Emp. Choice, Principles for Ethical Conduct 
During Union Representational Campaigns (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Authors). 
 241. Institute Directors, Inst. for Emp. Choice, http://www.employeechoice.org (select “About 
Us”) (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
 242. Id.  
 243. Richard Bensinger, Co-Chair, Inst. for Emp. Choice, Lecture at Cornell University (Feb. 13, 
2012). 
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share the core beliefs listed above.244 Their experiences and their beliefs 
led them to create an institute grounded on two principles: to do what is 
best for employees and to be governed by ethics—not law.245 
The Ethical Principles are as follows: 
  These principles define ethical conduct for both unions and 
employers and are based on the premise that employees will make the 
decision about organizing through a contested secret ballot election. 
(1): Truthfulness. The Employer and the Union should be truthful and 
accurate in their campaigns. Although the law does not regulate 
honesty, the parties have the ethical obligation to present accurate 
information to employees. If either side contends that a statement by 
the other is not accurate and truthful, the Institute for Employee 
Choice, a joint labor/management entity, will provide an opinion. 
(2): No threats, implicit or explicit. Neither the Union nor the 
Employer should make threats, implicit or explicit, in order to gain 
votes. A free choice requires that there be no coercion or fear. Under 
current law, veiled threats are tolerated and there are no meaningful 
penalties for direct threats. An atmosphere of fear is antithetical to 
free expression of employee choice. 
(3): No promises. Just as threats are not acceptable, neither are 
promises or bribes. Under the NLRA employers are prohibited but 
unions are allowed to make promises. Under these principles unions 
are also forbidden to make promises to gain votes. 
(4): It is not fair to imply that the exception is the rule. A common way 
of distorting the truth is by presenting an unusual situation, and 
implying that this is the norm. The parties must not use extreme 
examples to sway opinion. And also should tell the whole story. 
(5): Corporate campaigns. If employers agree to these principles, then 
unions should not undertake “corporate campaign” strategies designed 
to pressure the employer. These principles presume that both parties 
reach out to employees to present their case. Corporate campaigns are 
only ethical when there is an uneven playing field such that employee 
free choice is not meaningfully present. 
(6): Discharges. There should be no discharges, subcontracting of 
work, or layoffs aimed at discouraging union activity. This is the 
ultimate coercion, and immediately chills any possible free choice. 
Employers who terminate a known union supporter or member of the 
union’s organizing committee should submit the termination to 
immediate arbitration. Penalties for discharging a union supporter 
should include quadruple back pay as well as punitive damages to 
discourage such conduct. The reason that multiple backpay and 
reinstatement is not a sufficient deterrent is because this behavior has 
such a drastic chilling [e]ffect on the rest of the workforce. Punitive 
damages as appropriate are essential to deter such conduct. 
 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
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(7): Equal time, equal access, equal posting rights and all meetings are 
voluntary. The union must have equal access to the electorate 
including equal time for all meetings conducted as part of the 
employer’s campaign. A series of debates between management and 
the union is encouraged. The employees should have a right to hear 
both sides, without any advantage to either side. There should be no 
one on one meetings about the union between supervisors and 
employees. The union must be granted equal space to post literature 
on company property. 
(8): Delays. The employer should agree not to engage in delaying 
tactics. Parties cannot ethically rely on lengthy legal maneuvers to 
thwart freedom of choice. 
(9): No pressure to sign union cards. The union should not pressure 
employees to sign cards. Peer pressure or coercion to get people to sign 
union cards is not ethical. 
(10): Respect. Neither party should demonize its adversary. An 
atmosphere of mutual respect is necessary for an ethical climate. 
Unions have an important role in a democracy. Employers also are 
entitled to be respected. Neither party should engage in smear tactics. 
(11): Stacking the deck. Neither party should attempt to “stack the 
deck.” If employers accept these principles, then the union may not 
ethically plant undercover union-supporters (salts) into the workplace. 
Neither can employers seek to hire anti-union personnel in order to 
gain votes. 
(12): The final principle is not a specific ethical guideline, but the 
Golden Rule—do unto others as you would have them do to unto you. 
Both employers and unions have an important role to play in a vibrant 
democracy, and ethical behavior is an end in itself. The Institute for 
Employee Choice is available to support and commend employers and 
unions who agree to adhere to these principles246 
The substance of the Principles appeals to us for a number of 
reasons. The obvious reasons are that they provide for elections, full 
information, and truthfulness, and they prohibit coercion and 
intimidation. More important, they address the more subtle issues. The 
NLRA prohibits explicit threats, but any good management lawyer can 
make sure that the company’s implicit threats are lawfully conveyed.247 In 
addition, we support the Principles because they have one set of rules for 
both sides. Employees will get equal access to both sides and neither side 
will be able to exploit the rules to gain an advantage. While employers 
may bristle at inviting the union onto the premises, the elimination of 
 
 246. Bensinger & Shubert, supra note 240. 
 247. For example, compare what an employer cannot lawfully tell its employees (“If you vote for 
the union there will eventually be a strike, and there will be no wages, no health insurance, and 
strikers can lose their jobs when the strike is over”) with what employers may lawfully tell employees, 
(“We will bargain in good faith, but will not agree to unreasonable union demands. If the union does 
not accept our offer its only choice will be to call a strike. The company hopes this does not happen, 
but if it does, there will be no wages, no health insurance, and strikers can lose their jobs when the 
strike is over. We hope this does not happen, but it’s a real concern if you vote for the union.”). 
Eigen & SHERWYN_21 (F. VALDEZ) (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2012 5:22 PM 
March 2012]          MORAL/CONTRACTUAL LABOR LAW REFORM 737 
corporate campaigns, which are driven by union intimidation and 
management’s fear of the loss of business, should make an acceptable 
trade. 
In addition to satisfying our goals, the Principles are attractive 
because they may soon be operationalized. While the Institute has held 
only one election, the UAW recently announced a plan to operate under 
the Principles for all new elections.248 The UAW is currently in 
negotiations with the major multinational car manufacturers to make the 
Principles the method for all future elections.249 
Anecdotal evidence from the one past election showed that the 
employees who voted did, in fact, believe that they had full information 
to make a choice free from intimidation.250 The fact that these Principles 
may be used allows us to make a call for future research. We propose a 
commissioned study where researchers survey employees who have gone 
through organizing under the NLRA procedures, neutrality, and the 
Principles to determine if any system truly satisfies the goals outlined 
above. 
There are, of course, some issues that need to be addressed. The 
Principles prohibit one-on-one supervisor-employee conversations but 
do not address union organizers doing the same. We would allow 
supervisor conversations as long as they otherwise complied with the 
Principles. We would also allow union organizers to have similar 
conversations on an employer’s property. After the petition is filed, we 
would prohibit off-site campaigning by either side. 
B.  Enacting the Principles 
Finally, perhaps the most interesting issue at the heart of this Article 
is determining the optimal way to maximize the enforceability of the 
Principles. There are three possible approaches: (1) codify the Principles 
statutorily and impose legal sanctions for violations, (2) codify the 
Principles as an optional component part of the law, and provide 
incentives for unions and employers to agree to them and to comply, or 
(3) leave the Principles out of the law books, keeping their authority and 
enforceability entirely derived from extralegal sources. We address each 
of these options below. 
Codifying the Principles into law with legal sanctions in place for 
noncompliance seems like the mechanism least likely to yield the desired 
results. This mechanism most closely resembles the current scheme of the 
 
 248. UAW Principles for Fair Union Elections, UAW (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.uaw.org/articles/ 
uaw-principles-fair-union-elections; see Joan Silvi, Answering UAW’s Call: Doing the Right Thing, 
Solidarity Mag. (Jan.–Feb. 2011), http://www.uaw.org/story/answering-uaw’s-call.  
 249. Paul Ingrassia, The United Auto Workers Test Drive a New Model, Wall St. J. Online (Feb. 
6, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704709304576123822184484398.html. 
 250. Telephone Interview with Richard Bensinger, Co-Chair, Inst. for Emp. Choice (Feb. 7, 2011). 
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NLRA; implementing the Principles this way would do little more than 
reform a law plagued by inefficient system gaming by piling on more law 
ready to be equally inefficient and gamed by management and unions 
seeking to win. As they have done for decades under existing statutory 
regulation, unions and employers would have their lawyers opine on 
optimal ways of subverting and circumventing the rules, testing statutory 
language for interpretive weaknesses (for example, what is a “delay 
tactic” under the eighth principle—what if something has the effect of 
causing delay, but is done for some ulterior purpose?). The assumption 
some could make is that the cost of the sanction to the violator, 
discounted by the likelihood of being found in violation, is less than or 
equal to the administrative costs of investigation plus the costs of 
imposing those sanctions. These costs could be weighed against the 
benefits of circumventing the Principles. The probability that more 
employers and unions would make this calculus their primary means of 
determining whether to adhere to the Principles, and would engage in 
strategizing ways to subvert the Principles, would be greater under this 
implementation because neither unions nor employers would have any 
choice in agreeing to the terms. The contractual element of the Principles 
would be stripped away.  
There is substantial theory and some empirical evidence to support 
the argument we make here that entering into contracts (with the same 
terms) might make unions and employers more likely to feel bound by 
the terms of the agreement and to conceive of their obligations to 
perform the terms of the agreement out of moral or social/normative 
constraints instead of doing the cost-benefit calculus alone.251 We submit 
that enacting into law what really amounts to a moral obligation to “do 
the right thing” in union campaigns tethered with sanctions penalizing 
violations is likely to be as effective as music producers relying on 
intellectual property rights protection laws to police music pirating. The 
lessons learned from the Recording Industry Association of America’s 
difficulties fighting digital music piracy suggest that when moral 
obligations are framed as legal ones, with the threat of a sanction for 
failure to comply, less effective enforcement is likely to result.252 In fact, it 
may be the case that building a fence (in the form of statutes) prompts 
those perceived as fenced out to conceive of ways of jumping over the 
fence, and perhaps even implicitly challenges them to do so. The fence 
 
 251. Robert J. Bies & Tom R. Tyler, The “Litigation Mentality” in Organizations: A Test of 
Alternative Psychological Explanations, 4 Org. Sci. 352, 352 (1993) (identifying different psychological 
factors that could explain why employees consider suing their employers); Tyler, supra note 1, at 70–73 
(suggesting that individuals comply because of their long-term commitment to membership in a society 
rather than because of their short-term self-interests). 
 252. See Sudip Bhattacharjee et al., Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing Activity: An 
Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions, 49 J. Law & Econ. 91, 110 (2006). 
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shifts the perceived responsibility for the parameters on behavior to 
lawmakers and diminishes the moral responsibility for violations of the 
spirit of the law. 
It seems this is true for treatment of new proposals to amend labor 
law that do little more than add more laws. For instance, when President 
Obama was elected and EFCA seemed likely to pass, labor-and-
employment law firms responded by releasing memoranda to their 
clients advising them how to maximize management’s existing goals, 
perpetuating the status quo, and how to challenge the law directly and 
indirectly.253 Our claim is further bolstered by recent empirical work 
demonstrating that a legal threat to enforce a contract purporting to 
obligate individuals to perform an undesirable task is slightly less 
effective than a naked request to perform the same task.254 
We have a more difficult time adjudicating between the second and 
third proposed enforcement mechanisms than we do rejecting the first. 
Under the second proposed enforcement regime, employers and labor 
organizations would still have existing regulation setting the floor for 
their behavior. For the reasons discussed above, this floor is suboptimal. 
However, it does enjoy the undeniable advantage of augmented 
predictability and certainty. This should not be underestimated. If the 
Principles were codified as optionally available, such that both sides had 
to jointly register their agreement with the NLRB, creating a public 
certification thereof, this would create opportunities for increased 
enforcement through administrative channels. This would cost more, 
surely. What effect would it have on the parties’ behavior? In part, the 
effect likely would be a function of the kinds of incentives offered for 
agreement and compliance with the Principles. Two advantages of this 
enforcement scheme are incentives to agree to the Principles via a 
centralized agency, and casting a wider net to capture more organizing 
drives. We propose that the incentive for agreeing to the Principles is 
being listed in a publicly available database (that lists all petitions filed) 
as having agreed to the Principles. Employers and unions that agreed 
would also become eligible for tax incentives and for priority bidding 
rights on government contracting. Failing to agree would render an 
employer ineligible for such incentives and government contract work, 
and the public record would reflect which party or parties refused to sign 
the agreement. Parties that fully complied with the Principles (as 
determined by a neutral mediator-arbitrator, as described below, in the 
 
 253. See, e.g., Robert J. Battista et al., Littler Mendelson, P.C., The Employee Free Choice 
Act: A Critical Analysis (2008); Peter D. Conrad et al., Proskauer Rose LLP, The Employee 
Free Choice Act: Are You a Target? (2008); The EFCA, Organized Labor’s Legislative Agenda and 
Its Impact on Your Business, Fisher & Phillips LLP (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.laborlawyers.com/ 
shownews.aspx?Show=10884&Type=1122#Threat. 
 254. Eigen, supra note 4 (manuscript at 9). 
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event charges were filed alleging breach, or where no charges were filed 
at all) would be listed on the public database as having agreed to and 
complied with the Principles. Employers or unions that breached the 
agreement would lose their eligibility for tax incentives and government 
contract bidding, and would be listed on the public site as having agreed 
to the Principles and then failing to comply with them. 
The main advantage of this enforcement scheme is the set of options 
available to the parties, but this could also be a disadvantage because 
parties would self-select into or out of an enforcement regime we might 
prefer to see applied to all employers and unions. In some respects, this 
sorting could be viewed as a kind of proxy for prioritization for the kinds 
of workplaces, employment, and labor organizations that would be able 
to benefit. For instance, entertainment-industry guilds like the Writers’ 
Guild of America, the Screen Actors Guild, and the Directors Guild of 
America likely would be in the group that would benefit from this kind 
of incentive scheme, but perhaps not so for entertainment-industry 
unions that represent “below the line” employees like the Teamsters 
(representing transportation and casting directors), the International 
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, or the National Association of 
Broadcast Employees and Technicians. The first category of labor 
organizations cares more about its public reputation than does the latter. 
However, one way this problem could be ameliorated is by requiring 
unions and employers to complete a form when they submit their 
response to either agree to be bound by the Principles or not, which 
essentially would place them in a supply chain. For instance, if the 
Teamsters represent truck drivers of the Acme Truck Company, a 
company with a mostly unknown brand name, it might be difficult to 
discover where that company is in a supply chain. However, if Acme 
delivered coffee to Starbucks, Acme would be more readily discoverable 
because of that affiliation, making it and other similarly situated 
employers and unions more accountable under our proposed system. 
While this enforcement scheme seems better than the first one, it 
still might suffer from the moral obligation framed as a legal enforcement 
scheme problem identified above. Employers and unions will still see a 
cost-benefit analysis as the primary framing of the question of whether to 
agree to the Principles in a given election. Nonetheless, in the study cited 
above, morally framing a legally valenced contractual obligation sufficiently 
motivated parties to conform to the agreed-upon obligation.255 That is, 
perhaps it is the moral obligation partially connected to obeying the law, 
not just “living up to one’s word,” that makes the effects of a moral 
framing of contract enforceability so powerful in the cited experimental 
 
 255. Id. at 27. 
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study. This conforms with other recent empirical research in this area.256 
It is therefore unclear whether this enforcement scheme would produce 
the benefit of the moral framing’s powerful self-regulating motivation 
and the benefit of an instrumental framing’s motivation. It is also unclear 
whether this regime is better than the one evaluated next, in which the 
moral component of the agreement is made independently from a 
codified legal obligation. 
The third possible enforcement regime is perhaps the closest to a 
pure morally derived authority for enforcement as possible. Under this 
regime, the law would remain as it is now, and parties would be allowed 
to agree to the Principles on an ad hoc basis. The incentives to agree 
would be the same as they are now. This regime likely would result in the 
fewest number of total elections governed by the Principles, but perhaps 
also the lowest administrative cost of enforcement. The parties who 
agreed to the Principles under this regime probably would be the most 
likely to feel bound by the terms for moral reasons, or would otherwise 
have agreed because they had intended to behave in accordance with the 
Principles anyway, or because the employer would not have campaigned 
at all if indifferent to its workforce being unionized. Enforcement would 
be grounded in the same moral basis as some contracts are.257 This should 
not be underestimated. It could be argued that this enforcement regime 
would do better than the second one because the moral obligation is 
divorced from a legal one. Perhaps where contracts are concerned, the 
moral obligation, derivative even from the Bible, to live up to one’s 
word258 works in spite of any positivistic power of contract obedience 
(that the law requires enforcement of valid contracts). Promise and 
doctrinal contract have clearly intertwined roots,259 but there is little 
empirical evidence of how parties would interpret a promise like that 
embodied in the Principles and even less evidence of whether that 
promise would more likely be self-enforced with or without legal basis 
and obligation. 
 
 256. Feldman & Teichman, supra note 4, at 25–27; Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 4, at 420–
23; Yuval Feldman & Tom Tyler, Mandated Justice: The Potential Promise and Possible Pitfalls of 
Mandating Procedural Justice in the Workplace 2 (June 7, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133521. 
 257. See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 17 (1981) 
(“An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a 
convention whose function is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the promised 
performance. To renege is to abuse a confidence . . . . [T]o abuse that confidence now is like . . . lying: 
the abuse of a shared social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust.”). But see P.S. 
Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 652–59 (1979) (discussing the decline in the 
acceptance of a moral basis for contractual obligations).  
 258. “If a man . . . takes an oath to bind himself . . . he shall not violate his word . . . . ” Numbers 
30:2 (New Am. Std.). 
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(2007). 
Eigen & SHERWYN_21 (F. VALDEZ) (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2012 5:22 PM 
742 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:695 
In sum, it is difficult to determine whether embedding the Principles 
in the law as an optional, incentivized moral contract would result in less 
instrumentally minded decisionmaking and more moral-based 
decisionmaking than would leaving the Principles entirely outside of the 
law as a pure creature of contract. However, given the significant 
advantages of casting a wider net with the positive-incentive scheme 
identified above, especially the public accountability unavailable in the 
third regime-implementation option,260 we espouse the second option 
over the third. 
C.  Enforcing Agreements to Be Bound by the Principles 
In this Subpart, we address how we envision disputes over violations 
of the Principles being adjudicated and resolved. The NLRB would 
assign a mediator to each petitioned bargaining unit in which the parties 
agree to the Principles. If either side alleged a violation of the Principles 
before the election were held, the mediator would mediate this dispute. If 
the parties were unable to resolve their dispute through this process, the 
mediator would render a decision that could take one of four forms. The 
mediator would be empowered to conduct an arbitration hearing, taking 
testimony and evidence in the traditional manner. The mediator-
arbitrator then would determine whether the alleged offense violated the 
parties’ agreement, and if it did, what remedy to fashion. If the offense 
by management was so egregious that it poisoned the chances of 
conducting a fair election, the arbitrator might issue a bargaining order. 
The bar for such an order should be significantly lower than it is under 
current NLRB law. That is, the penalty associated with highly egregious 
violations of the Principles should be high. If the offense by the union 
was so egregious that it poisoned the chances of conducting a fair 
election, the arbitrator might rule that no election was to be held and 
that the union was barred from attempting to organize the employees for 
up to three years. For nonegregious violations of the Principles by 
management or the union, or in the event that employees (not privy to 
the agreement itself) were found to have done something that violated 
the terms of the agreement, the arbitrator would be empowered to 
fashion awards as she deemed necessary to facilitate a fair election 
procedure. This might include, but certainly would not be limited to, 
requiring management and the union to issue joint statements, or 
requiring one or the other to issue unilateral statements that ameliorated 
any tainting effects of conduct found to violate the Principles. 
After elections were held, the results would be not be released or 
publicized in any way for six days. Employers and unions may use this 
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time to determine whether any violations of the Principles occurred and 
to bring a claim to the mediator. If no claims were lodged, after this time 
the results of the election would be released and both sides by default 
would have waived their rights to allege any violations of the Principles 
or to challenge any of the votes for any reason other than issues relating 
to interpreting intentions of voters from their ballots. If charges were 
filed during the six-day period, the mediator would mediate the dispute 
and, failing successful mediation, arbitrate in the same manner as 
described above. Again, the mediator-arbitrator would be empowered to 
issue any manner of award, including issuing a bargaining order for 
egregious employer violations, or an election bar for up to three years for 
egregious union violations. 
A mediation/arbitration system like this one is likely to work best 
because it offers informality and flexibility, two important qualities of a 
dispute-resolution system for resolving claims arising out of a morally 
valenced contract.261 More control over the process should beget more 
control over the resolution of disputes and should result in more creative 
integrative solutions than would an adjudicatory process by itself.262 The 
opportunity for greater ownership over the dispute-resolution process 
and the ability to exert more influence over the outcomes of disputes 
should also be held out as a significant incentive for agreeing to the 
Principles. 
There are two primary means of evaluating the effectiveness of our 
proposed system. First, one would expect to see an increase in the 
number of elections held as a percentage of petitions filed where the 
Principles are agreed to as compared to instances where the Principles 
are not agreed to. This would be a victory in and of itself. Currently, the 
rate at which elections are held as a proportion of petitions filed is 65% 
by one estimate.263 Whether unions withdraw their petitions because of 
newly discovered information, because events that transpire that lead 
them to believe that they can no longer win, because the employer 
commits unfair labor practices that the union believes render victory 
impossible, or because the costs of victory appear too great, we suspect 
that where the Principles were agreed to, this rate would go up 
significantly. This would be considered a victory under the 
conceptualization of fairness advocated herein because more employee 
choice would determine the ultimate question of whether employees 
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wish to be represented or not than would other considerations such as 
union strategy, union expenses, employer strategy, gamesmanship, or 
other factors that further divorce election results from true employee 
preferences.264 
Second, we expect that employees would perceive the election 
procedure under the Principles as more fair. Increased perceived 
procedural fairness likely would lead to greater acceptance of the final 
outcome and, hence, less industrial strife.265 As mentioned earlier, the 
UAW has proposed following the Principles.266 Anecdotally, reports 
indicate improved perceived fairness, but no empirical work has been 
done to date that shows this to be true.267 Ideally, it would be useful to 
observe how employees regard the process under the Principles as 
compared to traditional campaigns pursuant to the NLRA (the current 
status quo) and as compared to the process when employers sign 
neutrality agreements. No such study has been done as yet, but such data 
would be instrumental in evaluating the ultimate effectiveness of the 
reform proposed herein. 
Conclusion 
The right to collectively organize in the workplace is an important 
one, even when union density is at such dismal levels. Public reaction to 
then-recently elected Governor Walker’s proposal in Wisconsin to 
eviscerate collective-bargaining rights for some public-sector unions 
shows that even if unions are unpopular, Americans seem to believe in 
the right to vote for or against a union and collectively bargain with 
employers.268 This core belief in the principle of the right to 
democratically elect one’s representatives—in public office or in the 
workplace—is at the heart of the conceptualization of fairness espoused 
herein. We propose aiming for revised procedures that most accord with 
this American ideal, without regard to election results. The focus should 
be on making the process as fair and just as possible, independently of 
the goal of turning around dwindling union-density trends. The law 
should not simply perform the function of a teeter-totter—pushing win-
rates up and then, at some time in the future when union density rises, 
pushing rates back down. This position should not be confused for a 
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desire to see union rates remain low or to decline further. To the 
contrary, the Authors recognize that there are serious gains that ought 
not to be overlooked that come from collective democratic participation 
by workers.269 However, reforming a system by presuming what 
employees want because they should want it seems backwards and even 
counterproductive if the end goal is increasing union density. Perhaps the 
focus ought to be shifted away from counting union shops and win rates, 
and towards revising the electoral process for collective representation in 
the workplace—something that American citizens seem to regard as a 
sacred component of our democracy. 
This does not stop us from wondering what effect the Principles 
incorporated into law as proposed would have on union density. As 
noted above, we expect the percentage of elections held as a function of 
petitions filed to go up, but there could also be a rise in the number of 
petitions filed. The leverage of the public specter of dishonesty or failure 
to abide by American principles of letting employees fairly vote up or 
down on a union could incentivize labor to file more petitions. Increasing 
the rate of petitions filed could inflate the denominator such that even if 
win rates remained constant, the win-rate percentage could drop. The 
question is whether improved procedural fairness will end up reflecting 
what unionists have told us—that employees really do want to be 
represented by unions but have been afraid to vote their true desires for 
fear of retribution. Or, will employers voluntarily imposing on 
themselves procedurally fair conditions signal the opposite of threats of 
retribution—that the employer is willing to respond reasonably to 
employee concerns—and lower the likelihood of unions winning more 
elections? An alternative signal to be gleaned from an employer signing 
on to the Principles is that it took the threat of unionization to make the 
employer honest. Or it could signal that the employer and union are able 
to agree on things contractually, so maybe employees could envision life 
under a collective-bargaining agreement as an improvement. Such signals 
would increase the likelihood of unions winning more elections. Clearly, 
more empirical research on the UAW’s experience with the Principles is 
warranted, if not urgently needed, in order to increase the chances that 
this proposal is taken seriously—something that could be critical as a 
means of reforming labor law without political loggerheads. 
A more interesting question is whether the Principles are applicable 
to other areas of employment and, ultimately, other areas of law. We 
believe that in the employment context, the adoption of a Principles-like 
standard could lead to a more efficient and humane work environment 
beneficial to employers, employees, taxpayers, and an overburdened 
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judicial system. Perhaps the only ones who would not benefit would be 
labor and employment lawyers. 
An examination of the nonunionized private sector reveals that the 
law alone incentivizes management to behave in ways that are risk averse 
because the floor of behavior the law creates makes exceeding the 
minimum inadvisable. In fact, there are situations in which enlightened 
human-resource procedures exceed the law’s protections, but they put 
the employer at risk for legal action and are therefore discouraged or 
avoided in spite of their clear benefits. For example, in sexual-
harassment law, employment policies that make it easier for employees 
to report harassment (such as 1-800 reporting numbers) increase the 
likelihood of employer exposure to liability.270 Some wage-and-hour laws 
prohibit employees and employers from agreeing to things that might be 
mutually beneficial without being exploitive, such as longer work days in 
exchange for time off, tip pooling, and modifying exempt and nonexempt 
statuses.271 There are situations in which both employees and employers 
would like to create their own work rules but are prohibited by law from 
doing so.272 We contend that employers who agree to the Principles 
should be able to enter into contracts with the employees that benefit all 
concerned. Thus, instead of enforcing laws drafted with the most 
unethical employers in mind, why not let ethical employers establish 
contracts with employees that are fair and benefit both? 
In the 1930s, labor and management were enemies. Each side 
thought it needed weapons to ensure peace. Today, the enemy is neither 
labor nor management. Instead, increased global competition, diminishing 
natural resources, environmental concerns, and sustaining a high 
standard of living are what both labor and capital must battle. Perhaps 
the Authors are overly optimistic, but one way to win this battle may be 
to have the former enemies stop trying to manipulate the law, and 
instead be guided by ethics, in order to compete with their real rivals. 
The hope is that affording parties the opportunity to succeed in this way 
will create an avenue to test whether we are overly optimistic. The costs 
of finding out are low, and the rewards could be significant. 
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